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ABSTRACT 
Achieving interoperability in a net-centric environment is fundamental to 
maximizing the potential of information sharing and effective use of resources in 
military operations. With the increasing reliance on unmanned platforms 
worldwide, there is a need to study the limitations of existing Command and 
Control (C2) Systems in dealing with the increasing number of objects. More 
processing power would be required to achieve or maintain a certain level of 
efficiency and effectiveness of the C2 system in managing and processing the 
tracks detected. Also, with increasing collaborations between services and allies, 
interoperability between multiple systems is pertinent. An additional challenge is 
the need to exchange target-rich tactical picture information. 
A systems engineering approach was used to identify the critical factors 
necessary in a C2 system to be architected to satisfy the needs for a future C2 
system able to achieve and maintain interoperability in a target rich environment. 
A pilot study was conducted using ExtendSim to model growing networks and 
injection of increased amounts of data to assess their impact on the timeliness of 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Achieving interoperability in a net-centric environment is fundamental to 
maximizing the potential of information sharing and effective use of resources in 
military operations. With the increasing reliance on unmanned platforms and use 
of highly complex and interconnected systems worldwide, there is a need to 
study the limitations of existing Command and Control (C2) systems in dealing 
with the increasing number of objects in the military domain. 
An analogy was drawn between systems interoperability and the inter-
relationships between humans at work to identify the factors that could affect the 
effectiveness and efficiency of system-to-system interoperability. These factors 
included network architecture, command and control, common ontology, systems 
integration, systems stability, information security, concept of operations, and 
management of change requirements. Using a systems engineering approach, 
the problem of establishing and maintaining multi-system interoperability in a 
target-rich environment was decomposed, further evaluated using the identified 
elements of interoperability, and addressed by allocating suitable processes to 
the problem components through the use of process decomposition.   
An ExtendSim model was designed and developed to simulate a multi-
system and multi-target environment transmission network model to study the 
issue of increasing number of systems in the system of systems (SoS) network 
and an increasingly congested environment. The model used the discrete 
modeling capability of the software to achieve a network able to propagate items 
from a starting system node to the other system nodes, with the items 
representing the data/information packages sent. The network model was 
evaluated using single and dual channel transmission, in which the 
data/information sending and feedback replies were sent on the same network 
path for the first simulation run and via separate paths for the next simulation run 
respectively. It was found that for the dual channel transmission configuration, 
the time delay incurred for the propagation of messages to all the nodes in the 
 xviii
system followed a near-linear incremental trend, which is an improvement from 
the exponential time delay incurred for the single channel transmission network 
model. With this, the time incurred for an overall communications loop between 
two systems, with multiple systems linked between them, was observed to be 
shorter for a dual channel transmission than a single channel transmission. Thus, 
to handle the increasing number of participating systems in the SoS and 
increasing number of targets in the environment, a secondary channel supporting 
the direct feedback of messages, such as a satellite link, would reduce the 
overall time delayed for messages to reach all systems and return to the 
originating system node.  
Future work includes parameter modifications to the existing network 
models to make them more realistic and applicable to other types of information 
transmission, comparison of the network models against other types of network 
models and performing quality loss function analysis on existing results to 
examine how much stakeholders are willing to pay for modifications to C2 
network architectures to improve its performance and thus, support critical 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Achieving interoperability in a network-centric environment is fundamental 
to maximizing the effectiveness in information sharing between entities and use 
of resources in military operations. This is especially true for the warfare of today 
in which network-centric warfare is seen as a force-multiplier (Alberts, Garstka, & 
Stein, Network centric warfare: developing and leveraging information superiority, 
1999) (Department of Defense, 2009) through effectively linking knowledgeable 
entities in the battlespace. In the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), network-
centricity or “net-centricity is defined as the ability to provide a framework for full 
human and technical interoperability that (1) allows all DoD users and mission 
partners to share the information they need, when they need it, in a form they 
can understand and act on with confidence and (2) protects information from 
those who should not have it.” Network-centric warfare is described by Alberts et 
al., as an information superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates 
increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters 
to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of 
operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-
synchronization (1999). 
As more and more systems are integrated into DoD’s net centric 
environment, information technology systems are evolving from 
sets of individual systems to sets of services that work in different 
combinations to meet different user needs. Work is needed to 
specifically address the issues of systems engineering in net-
centric enterprise systems. (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Systems and Software 
Engineering, 2008). 
A. WHAT IS INTEROPERABILITY? 
Interoperability is the ability of systems, units or forces to provide data and 
information to and accept the same from other systems, units or forces and to 
use the data and information so exchanged to enable these entities to operate 
together to achieve a common goal. These systems are integrated to form 
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outcomes such that they are able to achieve much more together than what 
individual systems can do on their own or by multiple systems acting individually.  
(Langford, 2012) segregates between integration and interaction as follows: 
 Integration provides adoption of ideas and causal changes 
 Interaction offers only the potential for integration 
The whole is crucially greater than the sum of its parts. Integration 
makes things happen faster with individual interacting objects. 
(Langford, 2012) 
 IT and NSS (National Security Systems) interoperability includes 
both the technical exchange of information and the operational 
effectiveness of that exchanged information as required for mission 
accomplishment. Interoperability includes systems, processes, 
procedures, organizations, and missions over the life cycle and 
must be balanced with Information Assurance. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2012) 
Interoperability between systems or force units within a battlespace allows 
for information and intelligence sharing which would help enhance overall 
situational awareness of these units and give them the information superiority 
edge so as to achieve better mission success. 
Interoperability between systems can be depicted as shown in Figure 1.  
Triangles illustrate the existing system (corresponding to the triangle below) and 
“wanted” system (corresponding to the triangle above). The purpose of the 
integration between these systems is to achieve the new capability only 
achievable from the integration (as depicted by the overlapping region between 
the 2 system triangles). The capability is driven by the mission requirements and 
constrained by the standards applicable to these types of systems. The 
requirements of the missions would also influence the interoperability required 
between these systems, subject to the capabilities of the new and existing 
system. Through correct, timely and meaningful exchange of energy, matter, 
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material wealth and information (EMMI1) between the “want” and “have” systems, 
these systems can then be able to connect, send and receive data/information 
between systems. The information exchange and use of the information to 
execute individual system actions towards achieving the ultimate goal of the 
mission would signify there is cohesion and coupling between the systems. With 
this interaction (connection, cohesion and coupling) between the systems, 
interoperability between these systems can then occur.  
 
Figure 1.   Illustration of System of Systems Interoperability 
(After Langford, 2012) 
Interoperability can also be viewed in the context of individuals working 
together in a company—the ability of individual people working together to 
                                            
1 Energy, Matter, Material Wealth and Information (EMMI) is a term coined by Langford (2012) 
to express the interactions between objects.   
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achieve a company’s goal of progress through data or information sharing and 
exchange. Maintaining discipline and order in an organization is captured in the 
function of ‘to manage’, i.e., command, control, communication, organization, 
planning, and team-building. All of these functions help with discipline and order. 
Additionally, the individual behaviors are also important. Behaviors derive from 
the organization’s environment and constraints as well as outside influences. 
These outside influences are referred to as externalities. Both systemic 
characteristics and externalities influence command and control from a 
perspective of discipline and order (Liebowitz & Margolis, 2012). 
The intricacies and dynamism in human working relationships are 
analogous to that of an environment in which systems work together to function 
better both individually and as a system of systems. For example, in their jobs, 
individuals are required to fulfill tasks related to their job scopes and these 
individuals (or systems) work on projects singly or in groups (systems of 
systems). These projects form a larger system of system, all in to help support 
the organization both in its operations. 
 Interoperability occurs between systems in a system of systems (SoS) 
configuration, where heterogeneous systems are able to operate both individually 
and as a group of systems, coming together to achieve a common mission or 
purpose. Heterogeneous is defined as composed of unrelated or differing parts 
or elements (Heterogeneous, n.d.). Gideon, Dagli and Miller (2005) described 
that a system of systems comprise of component systems that produce some 
utility together that is greater than the sum of the individual component systems. 
Thus, with different systems of different functionalities and capabilities 
collaborating, this heterogeneous combination could possibly provide the 
dynamic capability of the systems in the network to accomplish tasks that a 
group of similar systems would not be able to accomplish on their own.  
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Figure 2.   gives an operational view2 (OV-1) of a Naval Integrated Fire 
Control System in which several systems (geographically dispersed) are 
integrated via communication links for information and data exchange to perform 
the counter air mission as a united system. NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile 
Defense System comprises of sensors, command and control facilities and 
weapons systems, such as surface-based air defense and fighter aircraft, similar 
to the illustration shown in Figure 2.  This Integrated Air and Missile Defense 
System came to be after NATO nations participating in the military structure 
realized in the 1970s that national air defense systems operating independently 
were not as effective or efficient in protecting against air attack as they might be 
if operating in a more collective manner (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
2012). 
 
Figure 2.   Example of System of Systems – Naval Integrated Fire Control 
(From Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology, Systems and Software Engineering, 2008) 
                                            
2 An operational view (OV) is one of views defined in the Department of Defense Architecture 
Framework V1.5 (DoDAF) and identifies what needs to be accomplished and who does it. OV-1 
provides the high-level operational concept graphic to describe what an architecture is supposed 
to do, and how it is supposed to do it (Department of Defense, 2007). 
 6
Interoperability does not emerge immediately and obviously as a 
core warfighting need as does fightpower, mobility, or command 
and control. This could result in a lack of guiding oversight and of 
appropriate incentives resulting in sub-optimal choices based upon 
local motivations. (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2009) 
Thus, for interoperability to be feasible, an authority (as a form of control) 
oversees the planning of an interoperability roadmap and development or 
acquisition of military systems, so that existing and new systems could assimilate 
into the integration of the systems for interoperability, whilst still being able to 
meet future mission needs.   
In addition, with increasing reliance on unmanned systems in the 
battlefields (as will be covered in Section II), there is a greater need to ensure 
more effective and efficient collaboration between these systems, manned or 
unmanned. As discussed, interoperability between humans in a work 
environment is analogous to the interaction between systems in a SoS 
configuration. Elements, which could impact the interrelationships between 
systems as they affect humans, include ontology, communications network, 
command and control between these systems, operational stability of individual 
systems and the integration between them. The following section illustrates how 
these elements are important in contributing to the interoperability of systems 
when they operate in a SoS setup. 
1. Ontology 
Ontology is a description (like a formal specification of a program) of the 
concepts and relationships that can exist for an entity or a community of entities 
(Gruber, n.d.) and is a conceptual model that embodies information to enable 
information sharing and reuse. The description of ontology includes defined items, 
properties of those items, concepts that relate those items, rules that govern the 
inclusion or exclusion of those items, terminology that is restrictive (with regards 
to those items) and the relationships between those items. 
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Ontology provides for classifications of items under multiple categories as well as 
identification and selection based on definitions, properties, concepts, rules, 
terminology and relations.   
In dealing with interoperability, C2 ontology helps create a semantic 
representation of data and the links between these data, which will provide a 
framework to facilitate and regulate the information exchange between systems 
in C2 architecture. Accessing heterogeneous and distributed informational 
resources in a coordinated and virtual way requires appropriate semantic 
interoperability techniques to enable seamless access and retrieval of the right 
information resources, while preserving the information representation and 
management requirements for entities involved in the C2 architecture. 
2. Stability  
In control theory, system stability is extremely important and is generally a 
safety issue in the engineering of a system. The stability of a system relates to its 
responses to inputs or disturbances (Beardmore, 2006). 
Stability can also be thought of as a change in a “state” which has certain 
properties that are desirable to maintain.  Langford (2012) describes, 
For a system to exist and sustain itself as a system, it requires 
some semblance of metastability of stability to continue as a 
system… Metastability is the intrinsic property of a group of objects 
that persists in an apparent equilibrium of interactions between 
objects where only a small disturbance in the established 
interaction can dramatically change (reduce or increase) the 
system’s lifetime. 
Stability is desired in operational systems, especially military systems that 
have safety implications such as fire control systems, which when unstable (e.g., 
“opening-firing” when not commanded to), could result in potentially catastrophic 
consequences. Stability is required both locally in individual systems and globally 
in the SoS configuration. Local system stability is important to ensure that when 
an individual system joins a network of systems, it would continue to operate in a 
stable mode, albeit working together with other systems and more importantly, its 
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entry into the systems network would not disrupt operations. Conversely, when 
individual systems exit from the SoS network, these systems should continue to 
maintain stable operations and the remaining group of systems should continue 
to operate stably. Stability is also required in the medium by which these systems 
are connected, namely the network. If the network does not operate in a stable 
state, packets of information could be lost throughout the network, resulting in 
corrupted or incomplete data when received by the receiving system node. 
These are not desirable. 
Rechtin (1991) proposed that “complex systems will develop and evolve 
within an overall architecture much more rapidly if there are stable intermediate 
forms than if there are not,” in the context of a large architectural framework with 
top-down partitioning into stable elements. Having stable intermediate forms can 
help ensure some stability in the complex system by only proceeding on to the 
next step of systems integration. (from the simplest configuration to the more 
complex) when the previous step works. (Maier M. W., 1999) elaborated that the 
stability of intermediate forms means that the intermediate forms (or individual 
systems) should already be capable of operating and fulfilling useful purposes 
prior to full deployment or construction in a larger configuration of system of 
systems.   This idea of system evolution would provide some check on the 
overall stability of the integrated SoS as it grows larger.   
For a system to exist and sustain itself as a system, it requires a 
semblance of metastability or stability to continue as a system…  
Metastability is the intrinsic property of a group of objects that 
persists in an apparent equilibrium of interactions between objects 
where only a small disturbance in the established interaction can 
dramatically change (reduce or increase) the system’s lifetime. 
(Maier, 1999) 
Systems are mostly metastable within the lifespan of the system. However, 
the larger and more complex systems become, they become increasingly 




should be taken in the integration planning, design and implementation to ensure 
that as the system of systems evolves, the overall system will remain at least 
metastable over its lifetime.   
3. Command and Control  
Command and control is defined by the Research and Technology 
Organisation, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2004) as: “The organization, 
process, procedures and systems necessary to allow timely political and military 
commander to direct and control military forces.” C2 systems are defined to 
include: headquarters’ facilities, information systems, sensors and warning 
installations and communications.   
Command and control are subfunctions of the function “to manage” and 
can be decomposed as follows: 
To command: 
 To performing the art of assigning missions 
 To provide resources (analyze and prioritize) 
 To direct subordinates (guide, set policy and focus the force to 
accomplish clear objectives) 
 To analyze risk (identify and assess) 
To control: 
 To define limits 
 To negotiate 
 To deal with constraints 
 To determine requirements 
 To allocate resources 
 To report 
 To maintain performance (monitor, identify and correct deviations 
from guidance) 
Command and control are thus key elements to ensuring that there is 
regularity in the processes and procedures needed to be undertaken when 
 10
several systems are interoperating directly or indirectly to achieve a common 
goal. With the increasing reliance on unmanned systems to undertake jobs that 
are better suited for them to undertake, the more stringent “command” and 
“control” have to be to ensure that these systems are able to complement the 
manned systems in accomplishing the ultimate missions. 
4. Integration3 
Systems integration is the unification of the objects and their interactions 
of energy, matter, material wealth and information (EMMI) to provide system-
level functionalities and performances. Integration between systems occurs when 
there is a need to fulfill a new operational need that existing or standalone 
systems are unable to meet. To facilitate the integration, existing systems would 
have to be redesigned or updated so that they would be able to connect to and 
communicate with other systems (which could be new). 
Integrating a system into a system of systems results in a set of 
systems that are both integrated and interoperable to achieve a set 
of metasystem functions in which all the component systems 
participate (to a varying degree). (Langford, 2012) 
However, when two systems are integrated, both systems inevitably give 
up some form of flexibility in their operation and autonomous behavior.   
Integration of heterogeneous information systems, databases, application 
software, enterprise processes and network protocols are important to facilitate 
sharing of what is needed by others in a system or SoS. For this to happen, there 
must be consistency in their nomenclature, symbology, interaction conventions, 
or any of a host of other human interface variations among individual systems. 
However, enforcing semantic consistency could create challenges in the usability 
of the SoS as well as in the training pipeline needed to instill required skill sets 
(Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology, Systems and Software Engineering, 2008). The aim of semantic 
                                            
3 In this thesis, the term “systems integration” is used interchangeably with “integration.” 
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interoperability is the explicit ability to associate and compare different concepts 
on the basis of their semantic structures and relations. Once the ability to 
associate and the ability to compare concepts is established and sustained in a 
stable environment, semantic interoperability is achievable. Integrative structures 
and process provide those abilities. 
Semantic integration is treated as a category of concepts of individual and 
organizational activities (such as communications, workflow and decision-
making). Thinking of process as a developmental sequence of acts or activities, a 
theory of process consists of an explanation of how and why a process unfolds 
over time. At issue is the reciprocity of interoperability. Accordingly, if entity A 
sends data to entity B (with information exchange to carry out expected intent), 
then entity B must do the same for entity A. However, a change in B due to A’s 
sending or B’s receiving at the resource level may negate the ability for either 
entity to exchange information or to carry out their intentions. In this case, the 
degree of change in a process that results in a change in a system’s resource 
ontology may not allow for backward interoperability. The definition of 
interoperability must hold for backward interoperability (the simple, first order test 
of a good definition for interoperability). Emergence still occurs without reciprocity 
between entities A and B. This can be determined through identifying if that 
object has had a loss, i.e., an interaction has occurred and thus there was 
emergence. Integration has also occurred when there is any form of reciprocity. If 
only one object has a loss (i.e., there is no reciprocity), then there is not 
interoperability between the two entities. Thus, the definition of interoperability 
needs to incorporate the concept of reciprocity, which is easily handled at the 
enterprise level ontology. Dealing with the system-level or system of systems-




Trust is an important component to enable C2 systems’ interoperability 
with each other. Systems have to establish trust with other systems in the 
network of systems, such as C2 systems, before being able to join the network 
and commence information exchange. Trust is required for the enabling of 
systems to communicate and interoperate. Depending on the type of mission and 
information being exchanged amongst systems, the system of systems are likely 
to be protected from the rest of the world—the exchanged information or data 
should be kept within the network such that others outside the system network 
who are not authorized are not able to access the information. This includes both 
enemies and own-force systems that do not require such information, perhaps 
due to hierarchical restrictions.   
Although, for systems to communicate or operate within the net of 
systems, they would require the same communication medium and ontological 
similarity in their system interfaces, to prevent illegal interception of information 
exchange and hacking of systems, security measures such as encryption and 
firewalls would have to be incorporated into the system integration design. This is 
especially important with the increasing number of systems being included in the 
system of systems, as it would be difficult to track and identify every system 
within the entire network. 
This thesis assessed how a greater level of interoperability can be 
achieved by analyzing the specific issues that will thwart data exchange, limit or 




A. GENERAL NATURE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL 
1. C2 Definitions 
The terms “command,” “control” and “command and control” have been 
and are still being used exhaustively in military doctrines and operational 
vocabulary. However, there are varying ways and circumstances in which these 
words are being used, due to the lack of adequately defining these terms (Pigeau 
& McCann, 2002), which is evident in how the military (i.e., Navy, Air Force, Army, 
joint and coalition forces) has been conducting their missions and the C2 
literature written so far.   
Some branches of the military adopt the idea of mission command while 
others endorse a philosophy of centralized control and decentralized execution. 
Some view command and control as the same for practical purposes—in that 
“control is inherent in command” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001). 
NATO, on the other hand, defines command and control as: “the 
organisation, process, procedures and systems necessary to allow timely political 
and military decision-making and to enable military commanders to direct and 
control military forces.”  C2 systems are defined to include headquarters’ facilities, 
information systems, sensors and warning installations, and communications 
(Research and Technology Organisation, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 
2004). 
The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010) defines command and control to be “the exercise of 
authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and 
attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.” 
Pigeau and McCann (2002) describe command and control as: 
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The essence of control lies in structure and process, while the 
essence of command lies in creativity and will… Command and 
control are (also considered) to be complementary – command 
cannot be exercised without control, but control is meaningless 
without command. Command creates and changes the structures 
and processes of control to suit the uncertain military situation, thus 
making command pre-eminent. Control should always be 
subordinate to command. 
With disparate definitions of “command,” “control,” and “command and 
control,” and the shift of military operations towards network-centric warfare 
(NCW), it would only be beneficial to have common and consistent definitions of 
these terms.   
2. C2 Functional Decomposition 
The key ingredient in a C2 system is knowledge. Knowledge is an 
integration of information and data. Thus, C2 is integration of its processes. 
Being able to acquire, manage, advance, apply and integrate knowledge within a 
C2 system or system of systems would allow for better situational awareness. 
This would thereby result in better decision fitnes4 and decisions. The knowledge 
that is required for the best C2 system can be described in the following 
functional decomposition: 
 
Figure 3.   “Use Knowledge” Functional Decomposition 
                                            
4 Decision fitness is “illustrated as a chain of steps that describe the appropriate frame for the 
decision, the creative and doable alternatives that are possible, the meaningfulness and reliability 
of the information used, the clear values and tradeoffs, the logically correct reasoning, and the 
commitment to action” (Langford, 2012). 
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Command and control are functions and are sub-functions of the function 
“to manage” and these sub-functions can be decomposed as follows:   
To command: 
 Perform an art of assigning missions 
 Provide resources (analyze, prioritize) 
 Directing subordinates (guide, set policy and focus the force to 
accomplish clear objectives 
 Analyze risk (identify and assess)   
To control: 
 Define limits 
 Negotiate 
 Deal with constraints 
 Determine requirements 
 Allocate resources 
 Report 
 Maintain performance monitor, identify and correct deviations from 
guidance.   
Command is different from control and these functions are often 
performed by different people. 
3. Goals of a C2 System 
C2 systems exist for the following reasons:  
 To provide on-demand or just in time fused intelligences and 
situational awareness to the combatants.   
 To provide rapid turnaround time for collaborative planning 
 To provide rapid turnaround time for course of action 
 To support agile decision making 
 To support collaborative decision making 
 To provide information that is sufficiently informed by intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) 
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Thus, time is of the essence for C2 systems—for information exchange, 
processing and decision-making—especially for those working in collaboration. 
Delays (in system processing, communications or human) could result in late 
system and human response to a dire situation.   
B. EVOLUTION OF COMMAND AND OF CONTROL  
In understanding command and control, it is pertinent to first look at the 
revolution of military affairs. Missions today have evolved significantly from 
traditional military missions as a result of technological advancements, increasing 
asymmetrical challenges, the move from standalone systems to increasingly 
interconnected systems (emergence of system of systems ideology) and the 
move from platform-centric to network-centric warfare. Troops are now well 
connected in information networks, enabling individuals to operate in a 
distributed manner in a system of systems, increasing their capability to perform 
more effectively and in more complex scenarios. With the shift towards network-
centric operations, the amount of data and information exchange inevitably 
increases. However, this paradigm requires the system nodes that are connected 
in these networks to be able to efficiently and effectively manage, process and 
exchange information between them.   
Today’s missions differ from traditional military missions, not just at 
the margins, but qualitatively. Today’s missions are simultaneously 
more complex and more dynamic, requiring the collective 
capabilities and efforts of many organizations in order to succeed. 
This requirement for assembling a diverse set of capabilities and 
organizations into an effective coalition is accompanied by 
shrinking windows of response opportunity. Traditional approaches 
to C2 are not up to the challenge. Simply stated, they lack the 
agility required in the 21st century. (Alberts & Hayes, 2006) 
With military systems becoming increasingly connected, they become 
more agile and more able to handle peacetime and wartime scenarios. For 
example, the configuration of these systems assigned to a mission can be more 
efficiently rearranged depending on the capabilities of these systems; to work on 
the next mission as another set of systems without needing to recall/retrieve 
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them and restructure their communication and data exchange media. This could 
potentially cut a huge portion of mission preparation time.   
Although the purpose of Command and Control has remained 
unchanged since the earliest military forces engaged one another, 
the way we have thought about Command and Control and the 
means by which the functions of Command and Control have been 
accomplished have changed significantly over the course of history. 
These changes have resulted from the coevolution of Command 
and Control Approaches with technology, the nature of military 
operations, the capabilities of forces, and the environments in 
which militaries operate. (Alberts & Hayes, 2006) 
C. DISCUSSION OF PROBLEM DUE TO INCREASING RELIANCE ON 
UNMANNED SYSTEMS 
UAVs were considered exotic toys and not essential tools for 
victory on the modern battlefield. This all changed as the U.S. 
demand for surveillance assets soared and its fleet of UAVs 
expanded by leaps and bounds. (Quincy, Thompson, Moran, 
Nilsson, & Johnson, 2010) 
Unmanned vehicles are now seen less as a completely separate entity 
within the U.S. Department of Defense and have slowly gained a high level of 
acceptance and recognition as systems with improving reliability. With use of 
UAVs increasing from about 1,000 flight hours in 1987 to over 600,000 flight 
hours in 2008, their presence in combat has grown exponentially. 
Unmanned systems are gaining recognition in their fields (military or 
commercial) for their ability to relieve humans in tedious, repetitive and 
dangerous tasks. These provide new opportunities to augment the military and 
as avenues for experimentation. They have been employed by the DoD in air, 
ground and maritime domains intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) 
missions, convoy missions, improvised explosive device (IED) detections and 
mine-clearing.   
This increasing use of and reliance on unmanned systems would 
inevitably lead to an increase in data and information exchange, especially when 
these unmanned systems operate in a network of systems. There is a need to 
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manage the increase in data transmission, through stable and uninterrupted 
information transmission. This means that more resources (such as processing 
speed and bandwidth) are needed to handle the increase in network data, whilst 
maintaining the latency rate or delay times of the information exchange and with 
no compromise to data accuracy and transmission precision (i.e., correct data is 
sent to and received by the correct sender and recipient respectively). 
There is now a need to ensure high reliability of the unmanned systems (in 
terms of both hardware and software) and their precision performance so that 
they will be able to replace previously manned systems in performing their 
missions or complement their operations.  
D. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING 
SYSTEMS TO DEAL WITH INCREASING NUMBER OF OBJECTS 
With the networks of today’s systems already saturated with systems 
communicating and exchanging data with each other, when more objects try to 
join these networks, existing networks (including their system nodes) are unlikely 
to be able to handle the load. In addition, with fast advancing technology, system 
design and requirements would undoubtedly become more demanding and more 
challenging to achieve as expectations of senior commanders increase. Key 
problems related to the increasing number of objects introduced into the 
battlespace include the following: 
1. Increasing Complexity and Interconnectedness 
Langford (2012) described, “The more ambitious the integration, and the 
more out of control are the interfaces (i.e., not under change control or 
management), the more difficult the integration of the new product or service into 
the existing users’ environment and enterprise.” Indeed, with more systems 
(manned and unmanned) added to interoperate as a SoS, complexity in the 
integration increases as there is a common ontology and set of standards that 
they will need to conform to, including the use of consistent information 
assurance methodologies used between interacting systems.  
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Imposing these requirements on new systems to add to the SoS could be 
difficult, as they could be commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and thus be difficult to 
change (unless a high cost is incurred) or be OEM (Original Equipment 
Manufacturer) propriety systems that the OEMs refuse to modify or refuse to sell 
if their systems are going to be modified after sales. For legacy systems, 
enforcing standard ontology and standards for them to follow would also be 
challenging to achieve as these legacy systems are steeped in their own set of 
integration ontologies, standards and information assurance methodologies. To 
invoke a change in this would incur time and cost.    
Each system may also have its miniscule instabilities, which do not 
present themselves when these systems operate solo, but when operating 
together with other systems in a SoS configuration could initiate a chain of events, 
which could ultimately cause the entire SoS to fail. Thorough study, design and 
planning of the interfacing systems and understanding of their limitations in terms 
of data processing capability and transmission bandwidth should be carried out 
to identify any shortcomings that the individual systems and overall SoS would 
have in addressing the needs of the stakeholders.   
2.  Technological Limitations 
Today, with rapidly advancing technology and the constant push for 
excellence in both the military and the commercial market, products are often 
short of that one characteristic or element that would make it perfect. Similarly, 
for military systems, including C2 systems, the stakeholder expectations of these 
systems continue to grow with the system improvements and the technological 
gap will always exist.   
Technology maturity is a constraint on the achievability of future C2 
systems. System processing speeds and data storage are limited by the 
computer processor performance and capacity. Speed of data exchange 
between systems is constrained by the speed capabilities of existing systems to 
handle amounts of data larger than these systems have been designed for, 
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without affecting the relative speed of overall system performance. With the 
increasing number of objects sharing in the information and communication data 
bandwidth in the SoS, besides the high speed of transmission, accurate data and 
precise transmission are also important. Data packages should be sent to and 
received by intended parties, as they had been sent out by the sending party. On 
the contrary, data packages should not be sent to or received by unintended 
parties.   
E.  GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 
In their report on Creating an Assured Joint DoD and Interagency 
Interoperable Net-Centric Enterprise, the (Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2009) has highlighted a 
number of factors that have contributed to the DoD’s slow progress in attaining 
the goal of interoperability. Most importantly, “all combatant commands, military 
departments, and other defense components need the ability to operate 
unhindered in cyberspace, the domain does not fall within the purview of any one 
particular department or component.”  This results in the lack of an overall 
systems architecture, lack of a comprehensive interoperability risk analysis, 
which considers information assurance for net-centric/cyber systems and lack of 
planning and management of bandwidth and frequency allocation. The 
acquisition system has been unable to provide timely procurement of net-
centric/cyber systems to the warfighter, leaving a disparate set of current and 
legacy systems in the fleet.   
There is also the need for greater cooperation and collaboration between 
government (including government interagency collaboration), academia, and 
industry to address these challenges. Including academia and industry early in 
technology planning for interoperability and future capabilities could cut design 
and development time wasted for the industry to come up with new capabilities 
that do not add value to the military in attaining interoperability.   
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Finally, effective governance of the overall interoperable system of 
system, when attained, would need to be addressed as this domain currently 
does not fall under the purview of any single department or component. Roles 
and responsibilities would have to be properly planned out to avoid conflicts in 
command and control amongst the combatants in the SoS. Effective governance 
is made more complex with more systems being introduced into the SoS. 
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III. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The key problem to address was the establishment and maintenance of 
interoperability in a target-rich environment. 
A. PROBLEM DECOMPOSITION 
The problem statement was decomposed into its key elements, 
“interoperability” and “target-rich environment,” in this section to better 
understand the issue at hand. Interoperability was discussed in Chapter I and is 
the ability of systems, units or forces to provide data and information to and 
accept the same from other systems, units or forces and to use the data and 
information exchanged to enable these entities to operate together to achieve a 
common goal.  The notions of “systems of systems” and “network-centric warfare” 
are related to the problem statement as these systems described in the definition 
of “interoperability” are connected via networks and form systems of systems 
(SoS), locally and globally. Subsequently, what a ‘target-rich environment’ is and 
how it would affect interoperability was studied.  
1. System of Systems 
A paper on Systems-of-Systems by (Maier, 1999) described that: 
Systems-of-systems should be distinguished from large but 
monolithic systems by the independence of their components, their 
evolutionary nature, emergent behaviors, and a geographic extent 
that limits the interaction of their components to information 
exchange. Within these properties are further subdivisions. For 
example, a distinction between systems which are organized and 
managed to express particular functions, and those in which 
desired behaviors must emerge through voluntary and collaborative 
interaction. (Maier, 1999) 
Five principal characteristics are useful in distinguishing very large and 
complex but monolithic systems from true system-of-systems. The following 
characteristics are inherent in a system-of-systems: 
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1. Operational Independence of the Elements: If the SoS is 
deconstructed into its sub-systems, the component systems must 
be able to usefully operate independently. The SoS is composed of 
independent systems which are useful in their own right. 
2. Managerial Independence of the Elements: Although these 
component systems are able to operate as a SoS when they are 
integrated together, the sub-systems continue to maintain 
individual, independent operational existence whilst being a part of 
the SoS.   
3. Evolutionary Development: The system of systems’ capability 
continues to change as more systems are added. As technology 
and ideas progress, there is no need to redefine the systems of 
systems, but only the capability of the SoS continue to evolve and 
change.   
4. Emergent Behavior: The SoS performs functions and carries out 
purposes that do not reside in any component system. These 
behaviors are emergent properties of the entire system of systems 
and cannot be localized to any component system. The principal 
purposes of the systems of systems are fulfilled by these behaviors. 
5. Geographic Distribution: The geographic extent of the component 
systems may be large. Large is a nebulous and relative concept as 
communication capabilities increase. At a minimum, “large” means 
that the components can readily exchange only information and not 
substantial quantities of mass or energy. 
To attain interoperability, the components of command and control are 
needed to complement and regulate the system of systems. The SoS’s emergent 
and evolutionary characteristics as more component systems are added could be 
both beneficial but disadvantageous depending on the management of these 
component systems (they are operationally and managerially independent). Trust 
is an important interfacing component that these systems have to earn and 
maintain for them to be part of the SoS. If a system breaches the trust of another 
system through sending non-standard or corrupted messages, the connecting 
system could choose to drop this system’s connection.  
2.  Network-Centric Warfare 
Network-centric warfare (NCW) is an emerging theory of war in the 
Information Age. It is also a concept that, at the highest level, 
constitutes the military’s response to the Information Age. The term 
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network-centric warfare broadly describes the combination of 
strategies, emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures, and 
organizations that a fully or even a partially networked force can 
employ to create a decisive warfighting advantage. (Department of 
Defense, Office of Force Transformation, 2005) 
The backbone of interoperability is the notion of network-centric warfare 
across the spectrum of conflict, from peace, to crisis, to war. The network is the 
information technology in the SoS architecture and thus the enabler for the 
conduct of warfare in a networked environment.  “Networked” is one of the seven 
attributes, identified by the Joint Operations Concepts5 (JOpsC) that the future 
Joint Force must possess, the others being “fully integrated,” “expeditionary,” 
“decentralized,” “adaptable,” “decision superiority” and “lethality.” According to 
the JOpsC, “networked describes a Joint Force that is linked and synchronized in 
time and purpose.”  Having the units linked via networks promotes positive 
network externality 6  through enabling them to more efficiently communicate, 
share a common operating picture and achieve the desired end-state. The 
networked joint force would be better able to achieve beyond the organic 
capabilities of individual units to include fire support, sustainment and 
information. The network can include interagency, multinational allies, academia 
and industries. Planning of the networks is important to ensure optimal exchange 
and propagation of data through them. Negative network externalities such as 
having more systems joining the network than the network can handle to operate 
optimally could cause the network to meltdown.   
With the heavy reliance on technology, increasing collaborations between 
 
 
                                            
5 The Joint Operations Concepts is “an overarching definition of how the future Joint Force 
will operate across the entire range of military operations. It is the unifying framework for 
developing subordinate joint operating concepts, joint functional concepts, enabling concepts, 
and integrated capabilities.” (Department of Defense, 2003).  
6 Network externality has been defined as a change in the benefit, or surplus, that an agent 
derives from a good when the number of other agents consuming the same kind of good changes. 
(Liebowitz & Margolis, n.d.).  
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systems and military forces and the unchanging need for rapid decision-making, 
network-centric warfare is a concept that is at the very heart of the military 
operations of today.   
3.  Target-Rich Environment 
With the increasing numbers of unmanned systems employed in the 
military and the increasing reliance on them, the systems entwined in the future 
battlespace will have to combat the potentially vast quantities of data to manage, 
harvest and propagate within the SoS. This increase in data is a result of the 
large number of targets present in the systems’ tactical pictures (including own-
force units in their vicinity) and the data exchange between the large numbers of 
own-force units in contributing to the overall situational awareness of the SoS. A 
target-rich environment—many own-force units in an environment with many 
other systems—brings with it communication and data management challenges. 
In a SoS, systems must be able to handle the data load and ensure the data 
exchanges are accurate and precise. 
As the number of fielded systems grows, communications planners 
face challenges such as communication link security, radio 
frequency spectrum availability, deconfliction of frequencies and 
bandwidth, network infrastructure, and link ranges. Intelligent 
means of data parsing is needed to enable TPED (Tasking, 
Production, Exploitation, and Dissemination) and counter 
communication challenges. (Department of Defense, 2011)  
TPED is required to convert large amounts of sensor data into a common 
understanding of the environment. With more collaboration between inter-
government agencies and between allies, these communication challenges will 
only worsen and result in the limited communication between collaborating 
contingents or those limited information exchange if interoperability is required. 
Alongside communication challenges, having more targets inside the 
operational area of the SoS strains the management of the data within each 
system and the data exchanged, and the management of large number of 
systems being deployed. Deployment of vast quantities of systems into theater 
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and keeping them under command and control is challenging. These systems 
could be better managed through distributed command and control, in which key 
entities are selected as the main “command posts” empowered to control the 
lower entities within their local control perimeter. If not done properly, information 
or commands that are to be propagated to selected nodes will not reach these 
nodes or will be received by nodes not supposed to receive them.    
In planning for interoperability in a SoS configuration, one should gather 
information on the purpose, data capacity and processing speeds of the systems 
that is or will be part of the SoS. These system limitations restrict the type and 
size of the data that will be exchanged and received by these systems. 
Identifying the roles that these systems will play within the SoS (e.g., as relay 
nodes or intelligence-gathering) can help to frame the data package that is being 
received and/or sent by them.   
B.  BOUNDARIES & BOUNDARY CONDITIONS 
A condition is the circumstances that encompass an object; the 
factors that affect the manner and ways in which the object 
interacts; the situation in which the object operates; or the terms 
under which an object behaves. An object is influenced by its 
sensitivities to conditions. (Langford, 2012) 
To help scope and bound the problem addressed in this thesis, the 
boundaries (physical, functional and behavioral) of the problem and the 
conditions in which these boundaries will be affected is discussed in this section.   
1. Physical Boundaries 
a. Geographical Location of the SoS Deployment 
The geographical location of SoS deployment affects the amount of 
systems/units deployed, the amount of other non-own-force units that will be 
detected and shared amongst own force units as the common situational picture 
and tempo of battle. If the SoS is deployed into enemy territory, implications such 
as rapid and large amounts of data exchange and jamming of the SoS 
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communications will have to be taken care of. Interoperability requirements 
would be different depending on which spectrum (peace or war) of military 
operations the units in the SoS have to combat, which is affected by where they 
are deployed. 
b. Operating Range of Systems 
The operating range of the component systems’ communications 
equipment is a limiting factor which will result in a break in the data transmission 
(if any) when one end of the system moves outside the communications 
operating range. Operating range is also limited when integrating with ground 
systems that may face challenges of detecting other collaborating systems 
operating at low altitudes (including other ground systems), additional systems 
such as unmanned aerial vehicles could act as relay nodes to pass message to 
and from these ground systems, thereby providing an extension to the operating 
range of these systems. 
2. Functional Boundaries 
a. To Communicate 
Communication is a key function for the systems within the SoS 
network to enable them to interoperate/collaborate with each other. According to 
Dictionary.com, communication is the imparting or interchange of thoughts, 
opinions, or information by speech, writing, or signs (n.d.). In the context of this 
thesis, communication is the interchange or exchange of data, or information via 
network links such as local area networks (LAN) and wide area networks (WAN). 
These network links include the military data link radio networks using military 
data link standards such as Link 4, Link 11, Link 16, Link 22 and the variable 
message format (VMF) (Sturdy, 2004). The concept of NCW can only be 
achieved through communication within a SoS, without which, interoperability 
amongst the component systems cannot be achieved.  
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b. To Command 
As defined in Chapter I, “to command” is to perform the art of 
assigning missions; providing resources (analyze and prioritize); directing 
subordinates (guiding, setting policy and focusing the force to accomplish clear 
objectives);  and analyzing risk (identifying and assessing). The key focus areas 
of command in this paper was the authority that sets the policies and provides 
guidance to focus the force to accomplish clear objectives through mission 
objectives and establishing and giving them a clear concept of operations 
(CONOPS) for these missions. In addition, the authorities in command will have 
to be clear in their requirements for the SoS architecture to facilitate 
interoperability between these systems, and know the roles that the component 
systems play in the overall system and their placements in the overall hierarchy 
of systems.   
c. To Control 
As defined in Chapter I, “to control” defined limits; negotiated; dealt 
with constraints; determined requirements; allocated resources; reported; and 
maintained performance (monitored, identified and corrected deviations from 
guidance). Control includes the control of complex systems within the SoS which 
requires intelligence, communications and a mechanism for exercising authority 
(or ‘to command’). The more entities in the system, the “more critical, complex, 
and potentially vulnerable the central (the authority in-charge) become.”  There is 
the question of centralized or distributed control over these elements in the 
network—too little distribution could overwhelm the controlling central whilst 
overly-distributed control could cause conflict, confusion and breakdown of the 
overall network.  “Too much distribution of authority without distributed 
intelligence (whether human or machine) and there can be unresolvable conflict, 
confusion, and breakdown” (Rechtin, 1991). 
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d. To Propagate Information 
Information propagation can be seen as a parallel or a desired end-
state to communication. Propagation of information is required for the systems 
within the SoS to share its knowledge of the situational picture with the other 
system nodes that require them or are required to relay them further. If the 
system nodes designated to pass the information to its children nodes do not 
propagate the data/information as required or designed for the SoS network 
architecture, these children system nodes will not receive these data/information, 
and thus lose out on the common situational picture.    
e. To Process Information 
Individual system nodes in the network of SoS have to process the 
information that is sent to them, this includes filtering of unnecessary or 
unwanted data besides using them to result in an action at the system levels. 
Information to be propagated to adjoining nodes will also have to be processed 
or restructured to meet the interface specifications of the receiving node. In 
performing this function, the system node will have to ensure that the data or 
information received or sent are interpreted or parsed accurately, respectively. 
Inaccurate interpretation or parsing of data/information could lead to data 
corruption and this corruption could be propagated to the rest of the 
interoperating systems, or be filtered away by the first receiving party. This 
miscommunication could be controlled via the data filter processing of the 
receiving system node. 
3. Behavioral Boundaries 
a. SoS Emergence 
Emergence is defined by Langford (2012) as any effect that 




combining objects through the interactions of objects with EMMI. Emergence is 
due to the traits of an object or objects, process or processes. Emergent 
behavior is resulted when: 
The system performs functions and carries out purposes that do not 
reside in any component system. These behaviors are emergent 
properties of the entire system-of-systems and cannot be localized 
to any component system. The principal purposes of the systems-
of-systems are fulfilled by these behaviors. (Maier, 1999) 
Emergent properties may be beneficial, e.g., if the users adapt the 
resultant system to support tasks that the SoS architect never intended; or may 
be harmful, e.g., if safety requirements are undermined. (Johnson, 2012)  Care 
will need to be taken during system architecture design to ensure there is 
sufficient control over the system behavior (through clear requirements and 
traceability of system design to these requirements) to avoid negative emergence 
and avoid breach of safety requirements.   
It may not be possible to prevent all causes of negative emergence. 
Measures may only be plausible when negative emergence occurs and its cause 
identified.   In situations such as this, the problem may be correctable; otherwise, 
the operators of the systems involved could be warned to prevent action that 
would “activate” or propagate the emergence. 
b. Governance of Systems 
How the component systems contribute to the SoS, where they 
exist in the SoS architecture and the interfaces between these systems should 
be considered in the overall SoS risk assessment. Standards limiting the 
component systems’ and the interfacing specifications should be established and 
propagated to the component systems as a form of governance to prevent the 
occurrence of unexpected emergence behavior of the combined system.  
In addition, when systems interoperate or collaborate to work 
towards a common goal or mission, they may run into a situation in which it is no 
longer clear who has the overall command and control of these systems, which 
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form part of a bigger system-of-systems. This situation is what would happen 
when the integration of SoS entities are comprised of international allies—the 
aggregated forces operating on the same level of command, which could result in 
conflicts. The hierarchical structure of the SoS need to be well planned out.   
c. Data/Information Propagation 
Data/information propagation refers to the distribution of 
data/information between system nodes in the SoS. Efficiency of data/information 
distribution depends on the system network topology7 (e.g., bus, star, ring or 
mesh) and communication structure (i.e., determining which systems are pure 
receivers, pure transmitters and receiver/transmitters). A network’s topology 
affects its capabilities. Which topology is deployed for a SoS will impact the type 
of equipment the network needs, capabilities of the equipment, and the growth of 
network and the way in which the network is managed (Hsieh, n.d.). The 
communication structure will constrain how the data/information can be 
propagated in the network, e.g., system A, that is not supposed to have visibility 
or connection to system B, will not receive or send any information directly to 
system B. Changes to the network topology and communication structure would 
definitely influence the effectiveness of the mission carried out by the SoS.  
C. LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 
Limitations describe the extremes of operability of an entity at its 
boundaries (the physical extend of an entity); limitations are given by the domain 
of the problem and are conditions of boundaries, and once imposed they are 
immutable. Constraints on the other hand, are a structural property of the 
solution. Constraints are the results of boundary conditions. Constraints are 
conditions of allocations that once established are changeable, however 
vicissitudinous. Constraints are flexible within the overall limitations set 
(Langford, 2012). 
                                            
7 A network topology refers to the arrangement or physical layout of computers, cables, and 
other components on the network (Hsieh, n.d.).  
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Identifying the limitations and constraints of the solution space to address 
the problem of establishing and maintaining interoperability in a target-rich 
environment would help to scope the problem and discard solutions that will 
affect these limitations and constraints.  
1. Limitations 
a. Operational Space 
This refers to the area of operations in which the SoS will carry out 
its mission. The operational space will limit the extent of the network growth and 
act as the limiting operating range of the communication linkages between 
systems.   
b. Control 
“Control” by definition defines limits and by its action in the military 
context, imposes a limitation on the units/forces/systems under the “controller” to 
act on their own free will. Control refers to both the structure within which how the 
units/forces/systems are specified to perform (such as network architecture and 
hierarchical structure) and the control that the human operators set on the 
computer systems (e.g., manual, semi-autonomous and fully autonomous).   
Virtually all large complex systems and the organizations that build 
and operate them are regulated… A well-crafted regulation reduces 
uncertainty, provides standards, and protects suppliers and 
consumers against rapacious competitors. Poorly crafted regulation 
can do severe damage, overburdening and disrupting parts of the 
economic system. (Rechtin, 1991) 
In the context of military C2 systems, poorly crafted regulations can 
result in loose control over the component systems and result in overburdening 
and disruption in various parts in the SoS. 
c. Component System Performance 
The performance of the overall SoS is limited by the performance of 
the individual component systems that it is made up of. If a component system is 
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not able to update its system database at the same speed, if not faster, as the 
data/information is being received it its interface, data overflow could result. The 
component system would also be unable to store data/information larger than its 
total database storage size.   
2. Constraints 
a. Command and Control (C2) 
C2 constraints the boundaries within which the systems in the SoS 
function. These systems, when not within the network of SoS, are able to 
function without the influence of the SoS. However, when systems join the SoS 
to carry out missions, they are required to adhere to the interfacing (in terms of 
data packet formatting) and communication speed restrictions of the SoS.  
b. Policies 
A set of policies are principles, rules and guidelines formulated or 
adopted by an organization to reach its long-term goals and typically published in 
a booklet or other form that is widely accessible (policies and procedures, n.d.). 
Herein, policies refer to the principles, rules and guidelines that the commanders 
set and the human operators adhere by in carrying out their duties. Policies are 
key in keeping operations in control, especially in a configuration of SoS with 
numerous systems connected and communicating in an environment with large 
numbers of targets. In the conduct of missions, rules and guidelines could be 
bent in the process of achieving the ultimate goal of the mission.  
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis was to identify the key factors necessary in a C2 
system architecture to satisfy the needs for a future C2 system so as to establish 
and maintain interoperability in a target rich environment. It was recognized that it 
was not possible to specify every factor needed for interoperability between 
systems to take place. However, key factors that could improve the effectiveness 
 35
and efficiency in the establishment and maintainability of intersystem 
interoperability in a target-rich environment were described in Chapter IV.   
E. PROCESS DECOMPOSITION 
A process can be articulated as a systematic pattern, a coordinated 
set of procedures, tasks, activities, or acts that result from the 
conversion of inputs into outputs. Process is the amalgamation of 
activities and tools that combine ideas…  From an integration 
perspective, processes guide the work. (Langford, 2012) 
Process decomposition was used to identify the objective and subjective 
causalities that are relevant to the project, within the framework of integration. 
Key processes needed to address the problem of systems interoperability 
within a target-rich environment were identified using process decomposition and 
are listed as follows:  
1. Develop & Maintain Network Architecture 
1.1. Record and keep track of system interactions 
1.2. Use common/open architecture 
2.  Develop & Maintain C2 hierarchy 
2.1. Develop clear system reporting structure at higher system 
levels & propagate hierarchical report down accordingly 
2.2.  Assign ownership of sub-SoS/network systems 
3. Use common ontology within SoS 
4. Maintain information security  
4.1. Plan & implement hierarchical Information Assurance (IA) 
requirements 
4.2. Develop & implement security policies 
5. Perform system integration 
5.1. Upgrade legacy systems 
5.2. Impose relevant requirements on new systems 
5.3. Develop (optional) software patch for ease of integration 
5.4. Perform & maintain system-to-system connection / coupling 
cohesion 
5.5. Perform integration testing 
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6. Maintain system stability 
6.1. Maintain local system stability 
6.2. Maintain global system stability (even in situation of large 
numbers in system) 
6.3. Plan for high system reliability and maintainability 
6.4. Plan for operator training 
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IV. DEVELOPMENT OF SOLUTION  
A. NETWORK CONTROL THEORY 
Management of a large number of systems, which are interconnected 
based on their functionalities, capabilities and sub-mission allocations, require 
some form of control mechanism. This mechanism in the engineering discipline 
takes the form of control architectures. For large-scale systems, three possible 
control architectures are shown in Figure 4.   
 
Figure 4.   Architectures for Centralized, Decentralized and Distributed Control 
Architectures (From Jin, 2007) 
Distributed control architecture is most suited for the control of multiple 
decoupled subsystems {P1, P2, …, Pn}, with each subsystem equipped with a 
local controller. Interconnection exists amongst these controllers so that 
information can be shared and exchanged and interaction can result between 
these component systems. Thus, for a network-centric system of multi-agent 
systems, cooperative and coordinated control of a distributed control structure is 
most suitable.  
A typical diagram for a networked control system (NCS) depicting sub-
processes occurring within a subsystem was illustrated in Figure 5.  Based on 
the structure of the NCS, it can be observed that due to the following ideal 
conditions desired in a network architecture, conventional control theory is not 
sufficient (Jin, 2007): 
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 Infinite bandwidth:  The communication channel can only transmit 
data with certain precision under the constraint of limited 
bandwidth. Quantization and distortion must be considered for 
system design and analysis.  
 Reliable connections:  Sampled signals are transmitted in data 
packages that suffer from reliability issues such as unpredictable 
transmission delays and random packet drops 
 Static structure:  For networked multi-agent systems, dynamic 
routing and ad-hoc connectivity of modern communication networks 
makes the interaction topology time-variant and the coupling 
amongst agents may change with time.  
 
 
Figure 5.   Diagram of a Typical Networked Control System 
 (From Jin, 2007) 
Nonetheless, in addition to these considerations, military networks are 
also affected by the increasing number of systems joining in the SoS networks 
(due to increasing reliance of unmanned systems and introduction of new 
systems to augment their warfighting power) and the number of targets in the 
environment. Connection, coupling and cohesion between these component 




Figure 6.   Block Diagram Model of An Autonomous Switching Hybrid System 
(From Ding, 2009) 
According to Ding (2009), hybrid systems were described as: 
[s]ystems that are controlled by discrete events in the higher level, 
while their dynamical behaviors are governed by continuous 
dynamical laws in the lower levels… discrete events in the higher 
level dictate the continuous dynamical behavior of the system in the 
lower level. 
Hybrid system control problems occur in various situations, including 
those where a control module has to switch its attention among a number of 
subsystems, interact with them and achieve formation and coverage control of 
networked systems. Hybrid systems can be modeled using block diagrams as 
shown in Figure 6.  Such block diagrams can be related with interconnected 
system nodes with discrete events occurring within and between individual nodes, 
but there are also continuous dynamics occurring outside the systems. This 
concept was applied to the study of the impact of the number of system nodes 
within the SoS and the amount of information being shared or exchanged 
amongst these nodes.  
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B. APPROACH AND METHOD 
To establish and maintain interoperability in a target-rich environment, a 
systems engineering top-down approach was used to break down the problem 
space, described in Chapter II, to identify solutions to address these component 
problems. These solutions are recommendations, which may not apply to all 
types of system of systems configurations. The recommendations provide a set 
of guidelines in the development of a C2 SoS architecture.  
A pilot study of a network architecture simulating multiple system nodes 
using the general hybrid system model described by Ding (2009) was conducted. 
The study explored the influence of the quantity of system nodes in a SoS 
network, the amount of data/information being passed between the system 
nodes and how effective (in terms of timeliness) the system nodes are in 
receiving up-to-date information.    
An assessment of the factors required to achieve and maintain 
interoperability in a target-rich environment will first be discussed in Chapter V. 
Following which, an ExtendSim model was developed to study the effects of 
tolerable delays in data/information propagation throughout a multi-node system 
or system of systems linked together in a network configuration. The results 
obtained from the model were then discussed.   
C. PRINCIPLES 
A principle is a means of organizing thoughts to articulate a pattern of 
behavior that frames or structures action; it represents both the content and 
concepts that enable us to classify and interpret a situation in terms of previous 
situations.8 
Systems integration is not a small task, especially at the scale of an air-
defense system (Figure 2.  ). 
                                            
8 A situation is a sequence of events where an event describes an activity that relates an 
input EMMI to an output EMMI through causal mechanism (Langford, 2012). 
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“Application of best practices, or the systems engineering and 
management skills, products, and services (perfect or not so 
perfect) embody the key principles of systems integration.” 
Examining these principles (that are evident in one or more case 
studies) exposes the actions and circumstances that have major 
influence on the outcomes of system integration.” (Langford, 2012) 
Some of the following principles proposed by Langford (2012) provided 
guidance to the development of the solutions described in Chapters V to VII: 
 Principle 1: The Principle of Alignment. Alignment of strategies 
for the business enterprise, the key stakeholders and the project 
results in better outcomes for product or service development.  
 Principle 2: The Principle of Partitioning. Partitioning of objects 
can create tractable problems to solve if, and only if, boundary 
contiguity is achieved. 
 Principle 3: The Principle of Induction. Inductive reasoning 
should guide integration management and recursive thinking. 
 Principle 4: The Principle of Limitation. Integration is only as 
good as architecture captures stakeholder requirements. 
 Principle 5: The Principle of Forethought. Integration is a 
primary, key activity, not an afterthought considered as the result of 
development. 
 Principle 6: The Principle of Planning. Integration planning is 
predicated on pattern scheduling (lowest impact on budget), 
network scheduling (determinable impact on budget) and ad hoc 
scheduling (undetermined impact on budget). 
 Principle 7: The Principle of Loss. When two objects are 
integrated, both objects give up some measure of autonomous 
behavior. 
These principles could also be used to guide a system architect or 
integrator in the planning, design and development of any system.  
D. HEURISTICS 
Lists of heuristic ranging from multitask heuristics, scoping and planning 
heuristics, and aggregating heuristics are detailed in Maier and Rechtin’s, The 
Art of Systems Architecting (2009). However, it is impossible to identify all 
heuristics used in the problem and solution formulation of this thesis. 
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Nonetheless, the following heuristics describe some of the general problem 
solving and discovery processes employed in architecting this thesis and the 
network models studied:  
 Relationships among the elements are what give systems their 
added value. 
 In general, each system level provides a context for the level(s) 
below: 
 Leave the specialties to the specialist. The level of detail 
required by the architect is only to the depth of an element or 
component critical to the system as a whole. But the 
architect must have access to that level and know, or be 
informed, about is criticality and status. 
 Complex systems will develop and evolve within an 
architecture much more rapidly if there are stable 
intermediate forms than if there are not. 
 No complex system can be optimum to all parties concerned, nor 
all functions optimized. 
 Sometimes, but not always, the best way to solve a difficult problem 
is to expand the problem, itself. 
 Group elements that are strongly related to each other, separate 
elements that are unrelated. 
 Choose a configuration with minimal communications between the 
subsystems: 
 Choose the elements so that they are as independent as 
possible; that is elements with low external complexity (low 
coupling) and high internal complexity (high cohesion). 
 Choose a configuration in which local activity is high speed 
and global activity is slow change.  
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V. A FUTURE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM 
A. FUTURE COMMAND AND CONTROL 
1. A Science of Command and Control  
The increasing complexity of military combat systems and the ever-
changing military situation in the world today bring about uncertainties in the 
nature of future combat and thus a higher demand for flexibility and adaptability 
of command and control systems. This requires informational advantage and an 
accurate situational awareness of the battlespace, achievable through effective 
integration of heterogeneous sensors, arms and communication systems.  
Skyttner (2005) described a science of command and control through 
three various perspectives, namely: the General Living Systems (GLS) 
perspective, cybernetic perspective and communication and information 
perspective, which future C2 systems can be built based on. In thinking of C2 
systems, this science of C2 could be used to abstract the component systems 
and data and information exchange to facilitate the design and development 
process of C2 architectures.  
B. NEED FOR INTEROPERABILITY 
We must achieve: fundamentally joint, network-centric, distributed 
forces, capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects 
across the battlespace. Realising these capabilities will require 
transforming our people, processes and military forces. (Rumsfeld, 
2003) 
Possessing the capability to operate in a network-centric configuration has 
seen positive results in the battlefield. With NCW, geographically dispersed 
forces are able to achieve strategic, operational and tactical advantages through 
attainment of a high level of shared situational awareness. This interlinking of 
systems (people, platforms, weapons, sensors and decision aids) into a single 
network “creates a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.”  Networked 
forces become able to operate with increased speed and synchronization and 
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are capable of achieving massed effects, oftentimes, without the physical 
massing of forces required in the past (Department of Defense, Office of Force 
Transformation, 2005). 
1. Levels of Interoperability 
 
Figure 7.   Network-Centric Warfare Tenets 
(From Alberts & Hayes, 2003) 
Alberts and Hayes (2003) described the basic tenets of NCW as illustrated 
in Figure 7.   
The degree to which forces are interoperable directly affects their 
ability to conduct network-centric operations. Interoperability must 
be present in each of the four domains: physical, information, 
cognitive and social. 
The level of interoperability between systems can also be evaluated 
through the relationships between these systems based on their connectivity, 
coupling and cohesion. Connectivity9 between systems (force entities, as well as 
                                            
9 “Connectivity is the physical connection between objects.  Connection is established by an 
interaction of one object with another through EMMI” (Langford, 2012). 
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other entities that the force needs to work or collaborate with) is the first step to 
interoperability—a physical connection between them is required for data and 
information transmission. Cohesion and coupling are direct indicators of 
interaction as they are defined as measurable concepts, rather than specific 
measures. Cohesion is the characterization of the measure of binding between 
two objects through their interaction(s). The strength or degree of interaction 
means that two objects can be coupled under various conditions in which their 
interactions can change each other. Coupling is the degree of dependency 
between objects or processes (Langford, 2012). 
2. NCW Maturity Model 
 
Figure 8.   NCW Maturity Model (From Alberts & Hayes, 2003) 
The network-centric maturity model, depicted in Figure 8.  , defines five 
levels of maturity and a hypothesized migration path for the implementation of 
network-centric capabilities in an organization (Alberts & Hayes, 2003). In a pure 
platform-centric, stove-piped world, sensors are “owned” by the platforms and the 
information available to those on a given platform only comes from these 
 46
“organic” sensors. Thus, situation awareness is only developed from organic 
sources. Level 0, the baseline, is defined as operations that employ traditional 
command and control processes (e.g., centralized planning) with information 
created solely from organic sources. As the level progresses, the maturity of the 
situational awareness becomes more network-centric.  
However, to arrive at the end-goal of “joint, network-centric, distributed 
forces capable of rapid decision superiority,” the systems in these distributed 
forces must first possess the capability to connect to and interact with other 
systems in the network. The challenge in interlinking these systems is not 
isolated to the technicalities of the systems integration, such as developing 
interfaces for the systems to be integrated and taking into consideration the 
data/information exchange limitations in terms of data rate and size. It is also 
important to ensure that the stability and security of the integrated system are not 
compromised. These elements and other factors important in the achievement of 
interoperability are discussed in the next section.   
C. KEY FACTORS REQUIRED FOR INTEROPERABILITY 
Interoperability, as described in Chapter I, is the ability of systems, units or 
forces to provide data and information to and accept the same from other 
systems, units or forces, and to use the data and information so exchanged to 
enable these entities to operate together to achieve a common goal.   
There is no one formula to achieving interoperability. The composition of 
the systems, operating environment, operators, commanders would be different 
between different types of SoS. A different set of requirements for each SoS 
would drive a different design and architecture for the SoS. Nonetheless, through 
breaking down the problem of “establishment and maintenance of interoperability 
in a target-rich environment” and identifying the boundaries, limits and 




had been identified in Chapter III. In this section, these processes will be 
presented in detail to illustrate why they are important for a successful SoS 
interoperability.   
1. Network Architecture  
Network architecture was not studied in detail in this thesis, but 
nonetheless has a large impact on the efficiency (speed of data/information 
propagation) and effectiveness (percentage of systems receiving 
data/information intended for them) of the system of systems. Today, systems 
are increasingly being connected and integrated to achieve a higher goal or 
capability. In dealing with a system of several heterogeneous systems, a well-
planned and implemented network architecture needs to be in place to prevent 
negative network externalities and thereby facilitate smooth system operations.   
a. System Interactions  
Various network topologies have been used in LAN and WAN 
designs, some of which include bus, ring, star and hybrid networks. There are 
advantages and disadvantages to each type of topology as described by Pawar 
(2008) and the Florida Center for Instructional Technology (2012). Dekker (2005) 
also explored networks generated using the method of Scale-Free Networks 
introduced by Kawachi, Murata, Yoshii and Kakazu (2004), in which the topology 
of a network can be altered to match the connectivity requirements of the 
component systems without altering the number of links.   
Network architectures should be chosen on the interaction 
requirements of the component systems in a SoS. In dealing with the interactions 
between a large quantity of systems, a star-bus topology (Figure 9.  ) which 
combines characteristics of linear bus and star topologies can be used  (Hsieh, 
2012). This type of topology minimizes failure of the entire network, as the 
breakdown of a child subsystem that is not a parent to other subsystems would 
not affect the rest of the network. If a hub (a system connected to both parent 
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and child-type systems) fails, all child systems connected to that hub will be 
unable to communicate with the rest of the network and vice versa.   
 
 
Figure 9.   Hybrid Star-Bus Network Topology (From Hsieh, 2012) 
A combination of top-down and bottom-up design methodology can 
be used to map the network architecture of participating component systems in a 
SoS. Operational capabilities (in terms of storage, processing and functionalities) 
and available interfacing connections of participating systems should be noted 
and considered in the SoS network architecture design. With clear SoS goals 
and mission objectives, these mission requirements can be decomposed into 
individual processes which can be matched against sub-system clusters able to 
meet these objectives. Through iterative matching and modifying the links 
between systems (taking into consideration the processing/storage capacity 
discrepancies and available connection mediums), network connections could be 
mapped out.  
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For SoS types involving multiple domain platforms, i.e., land, air 
and sea assets, care must also be taken to ensure that the network architecture 
is able to work within the limits of the component systems’ operating ranges 
depending on their geographical deployments. For example, the operational 
connectivity of an asset working at a distance outside line-of-sight range of 
land/sea platforms could be extended through deployment of air platforms (such 
as UAVs) to act as interim connecting sub-systems to extend the SoS network’s 
geographical operating range to that asset.   
b. Use of Common/Open Architecture 
In network infrastructure, the term ‘open architecture’ refers to the 
practice of using virtually any combination of standards-compliant components in 
the design of the network. (Hitachi Cable Manchester, 2012)  Analogous to the 
ease of communications between individuals who speak the same language 
instead of different languages, the use of a common architecture such as open 
architecture could potentially ease the systems integration process.   
To meet Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) of the U.S. Navy, ADM 
Roughhead’s priorities to exploit cutting-edge technology and identify the way 
ahead for the U.S. Navy, the Naval Open Architecture (OA) vision was to:  
“Transform our organization and culture and align our resources to 
adopt and institutionalize open architecture principles and processes throughout 
the naval community in order to deliver more warfighting capabilities to counter 
current and future threats.” 
The desired state of the military include being able to leverage on 
the information-centric, common platforms that facilitate collaboration between 
joint forces and international partners, and having new systems that not only 
addresses the current needs but also have the flexibility and extensibility to 
handle the future challenges of the battlefield. There are several challenges that 
need to be overcome in order to achieve this desired technical state. Steady or 
declining defense budgets drive the shift towards enterprise architecture enabling 
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software modularity and reuse to reduce both cost and risk in procurement, 
maintenance and system upgrades. Contracts and incentives must reshape 
business models in dealing with industrial partners to break away from traditional, 
closed platform style of procurement. Open architecture would provide the 
means for the military to meet such challenges.  
Naval Open Architecture is the confluence of business and 
technical practices yielding modular, interoperable systems that 
adhere to open standards with published interfaces. This approach 
significantly increases opportunities for innovation and competition, 
enables reuse of components, facilitates rapid technology insertion, 
and reduces maintenance constraints. OA delivers increased 
warfighting capabilities in a shorter time at reduced cost. This 
initiative is a key enabler and pillar of the Department of Defense’s 
(DoD) focus on joint architectures and evolutionary acquisition.  
By adopting OA principles throughout the Naval enterprise today, 
we can build modular, affordable, future National Security Systems 
designed to meet the future needs of our warfighters. These 
systems will also be able to readily incorporate insertion of new 
technologies from a broad range of industry partners. (Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations Staff [OPNAV], 2008) 
The Office of Naval Operations Staff, Warfare Requirements and 
Programs (N6/N7) identified the following five principles to guide their efforts 
towards achieving the Naval OA Vision: 
1. Encourage competition and collaboration through development of 
alternative solutions and sources. 
2. Build modular designs and disclose data to permit evolutionary 
designs, technology insertion, competitive innovation and 
alternative competitive approaches from multiple qualified sources. 
3. Build interoperable joint warfighting applications and ensure secure 
information exchange using common services (e.g., common time 
reference), common warfighting applications (e.g., track manager) 
and information assurance as intrinsic design elements. 
4. Identify or develop reusable application software selected through 
open competition of “best of breed” candidates, reviewed by subject 
matter expert peers and based on data-driven analysis and 
experimentation to meet operational requirements. 
5. Ensure life cycle affordability including system design, 
development, delivery, and support while mitigating Commercial off 
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the Shelf obsolescence by exploiting the Rapid Capability Insertion 
Process / Advanced Processor Build methodology. 
The execution of the naval open architecture has proven to be 
successful and effective, relying on substantive and concerted contributions of 
analysis, thought leadership and work by key stakeholders (OPNAV, 2008). 
In the Open Architecture Technical Principles and Guidelines 
compiled by IBM, open architecture is described to be “a pattern of nonfunctional 
requirements (NFRs) that contribute to the ability to create, deploy and manage 
OA systems” (Nelson, 2008). With the increasing use of open standards in both 
COTS and open-sourced software, the visibility of component-based, 
interchangeable software for complex systems is increased and OA is viable.  
The use of open architecture has yielded positive results: 
 Rapid adoption of technology. 
 Easier test and integration. 
 Rapid improvement in technology capability and 
performance. 
 Reduced life cycle cost due to increased competition, easier 
maintenance and upgrades, broader knowledge base and 
greater exploitation of reusability. 
Nonetheless, for open architecture to be embraced by the military 
community, industrial partners/contracts would also have a part to play in 
incorporating open architectural concepts into their products and services. 
Conversely, the military procurement department or agencies could also set the 
use of open architecture as a requirement for the systems, platforms or services 
that they wish to procure from these contractors.  
2. Command and Control (C2) 
a. C2 Systems 
C2 systems are important in orchestrating groups of 
systems/platforms as they facilitate the information exchange, processing and 
decision-making process of these systems/platforms. With increasing reliance on 
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unmanned systems, increasing deployment of highly complex systems and 
increasing number of targets in the battlefields of today, C2 systems take on a 
heavier responsibility in providing on-demand or just-in-time situational pictures 
to the combatants.   
To manage this, C2 systems also become more interconnected, 
and thus complicated. Care should be taken to control the C2 evolutionary 
development such that the system, both locally and as a global system of 
systems, continue to remain in their metastable, if not stable state.   
Other challenges of command and control systems include the 
“difficulty of accomplishing changes in established networks,” “the continuing 
growth of most communication networks,” and the “need to respond promptly and 
reliably during crises” for real-time intelligence systems and the critical interface 
between the systems and the commanders (Rechtin, 1991). Planning and 
designing for the potential occurrence of these challenges during the design and 
development phases of the SoS network architecture would help prepare the 
SoS stakeholders for the change.  
For C2 systems operated with humans-in-the-loop, key decisions 
such as fire-commands are usually still left to the operator to decide and give the 
go ahead. However, humans are not as adept at processing large amounts of 
data/information within a short time frame as the machines, although humans are 
better able to make sense out of a limited set of data/information than machines. 
To cater for human decisions and responses, pre-processing data/information by 
the machines and controlling the amount and type of information to be presented 
to the human would help reduce the mental stress that could be put on the 
human when large amounts of information is presented to him/her.   
b. C2 Hierarchy 
Despite variations in the definition of “Command and Control,” 
“command” was consistently identified with the authority which takes charge of 
the decision-making, and sets policies and provides guidance to help the 
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combatants accomplish their mission goals with clear instructions (mission 
objectives) and concept of operations. Command can also be considered as a 
subset of control, in which commanders determine how the forces are to be 
deployed and interoperate.   
C2 systems are unlike first come, first serve networks; they are a 
priority system. Rechtin (1991) described the challenge associated with many 
commanders directing and controlling the systems in the SoS network as follows: 
“With many individuals calling for priority, someone has to keep order. Someone 
has to command and control the C3I system.” 10   However, in a system of 
systems, in which combatants could comprise of international partners and 
across different domain forces, there would be commanders holding similar level 
posts and conflicts could arise during operations if the reporting and operations 
structure of the SoS were not clear.   
Having well-defined roles and responsibilities identified for the 
systems in the SoS network before actual deployment or operations could help to 
prevent potential conflicts and potential instabilities to surface during SoS 
operations.  
3. Use of Common Ontology within System of Systems 
As described in Chapter I, Section A, ontology helps to represent 
information so as to facilitate information sharing and reuse. With regards to 
multi-system interoperability, having a C2 ontology would help to present the 
exchanged data and relationships between these data in a consistent format, 
over all systems (or at least within clusters of systems which interact more often 
together) such that there would be less need of a translator in the interfaces 
between subsystems in the SoS.   
Besides a common C2 ontology, efforts should also be made on the 
command and control semantics, such as understanding of threat characteristics 
                                            
10 C3I systems refer to command, control, communications and intelligence systems.  
 54
and their classifications, between forces to facilitate the information sharing and 
exchange. Having a consistent understanding and description of military terms 
would definitely aid communication and understanding between forces and with 
international partners with the same ontological understanding.  
4. Systems Integration 
a. System-to-System Connection/Coupling/Cohesion 
Systems integration provides potential in improving in the overall 
performance of the system of systems. Systems are integrated to create the new 
capability that would not be achievable without the joining of the systems. For the 
interoperability of the systems to work, one would need to identify and plan for 
the connection, coupling, and cohesion between systems. Intersystem semantics, 
interaction conventions, and symbology would need to reconciled and made 
consistent.   
The integration of systems would also result in these systems 
experiencing a loss. The loss can take any form, e.g., individual system capability 
loss, opportunity loss, energy loss or financial loss. Trade-off analysis could also 
be conducted between potential systems to be integrated to identify if the cluster 
of systems would perform better or have higher reliability in the overall system if 
interacting in alternative methods, e.g., being connected in hybrid star-bus 
network topology instead of a linear bus network topology. 
The level of coupling and cohesion between systems would 
determine the direction, type and amount of information flow between these 
systems, and thus would directly affect the network traffic in the data-links 
between these component systems. Segmenting systems based on which 
systems they will only be communicating with, eliminating unnecessary 
data/information packages and directing data/information messages to select 
target system nodes instead of broadcasting the messages to all in the network 
of systems could help to reduce the network traffic and improve the timeliness 
performance of information sharing and exchange.  
 55
To integrate systems, some factors that should be taken into 
consideration include performance characteristics (including considerations if a 
system should continue to operate in a deteriorated state or switch to a fail-safe 
mode if significantly damaged) and possible emergent (positive or negative) 
properties of the SoS or sub-systems. These factors could help to form a 
baseline in determining the suitability of the integration and the performance to 
be expected of the SoS in various situations, such as loss of connection between 
two systems or failure of a particular system node.  
b. Legacy vs. New Systems 
Legacy systems are obsolete or old systems, which could have 
lesser processing capabilities and old technology, but they may still be useful in 
augmenting the military’s warfighting capabilities. In planning for interoperability 
between legacy systems and new systems, which should already follow the 
network architectural ontology requirements and perhaps an open architecture 
integration concept, there is a need to consider the interim integration of the 
legacy systems to the SoS and easy detachment of these legacy systems from 
the SoS network. Planning for the temporary inclusion of the legacy systems and 
for their eventual retirement from the system of systems network would reduce 
complications in the transitioning phases. The actual implementation of 
upgrading the legacy systems to work in the SoS network and their eventual 
phase-out should also be done in phases, in which select legacy systems are 
upgraded or phased out over planned out periods.   
Introduction of new systems into the SoS network should also be 
carried out in phases so as to cater for in-between phases testing to ensure there 
is no complications or negative emergence behavior resulting from the 
integration.   
c. Integration Testing 
With the large number of systems to be integrated together in a 
SoS, adopting a phased, incremental integration and testing approach could help 
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to identify and reduce network externalities and counter negative emergence. 
Measures could also be introduced to minimize the occurrence of network 
externalities or negative emergences that cannot be removed entirely.   
Before testing could be carried out, there must be clear 
documentation of the connection, coupling and cohesion that exist between the 
systems and the interface messages to be exchanged between them. Test 
procedures, which describe the expected operations of the interfaces between 
systems, should be documented and used in functional testing. Following which, 
functional testing of smaller clusters of systems can then proceed before the 
number of connections between the systems in the SoS increase and testing 
continues.  
5. System Stability 
As discussed in Section A of Chapter I, stability is desired in operational 
military systems, especially those with the capability to deal physical damage to 
other systems. The example covered highlighted the fire control system, which 
could potentially result in fatalities if it were unstable, e.g., opening fire on targets 
when not commanded to. 
a. Local and Global Stability 
Separately, individual systems and smaller clusters of systems are 
preferred to be stable sub-systems or systems. Stability of a system relates to its 
reliability and, if stability is poor, system breakdown or failures could ensue and 
result in subsequent breakdown of the rest of the SoS network, depending on the 
connection network of the systems. Besides reliability, stability of a system also 
includes accuracy and precision of data transmission. If the data/information 
packages are not sent to and received by the correct system node in the format 
as expected, the overall system comprising of the interacting systems becomes 
an unstable system. Stability or metastability of the system should be maintained 
regardless of introduction or removal of a component system from the SoS.  
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Systems are mostly metastable within the lifespan of the system 
and may contain miniscule instabilities. As systems grow in size and complexity, 
they become increasingly easy to be affected by slight disturbances in the SoS 
operating environment, even if introduced by other component systems 
connected to the SoS. System instabilities could be a result of software 
deficiencies, which can only be identified through thorough testing of the 
interfacing software. With the SoS network spanning across heterogeneous 
component systems, it may be impossible to rid the SoS of all system 
instabilities, some of which may appear as network externalities or emergence. 
Nonetheless, steps should be taken to ensure that if these network issues are 
observed, the SoS architect should identify control measures to prevent further 
occurrence. Integration planning, design and implementation of the SoS should 
be conducted in careful and detailed processes to ensure that as the system of 
systems evolves, the overall system will remain at least metastable over its 
lifetime.   
b. Operator Training 
For the smooth operation of the systems in the SoS and the SoS 
itself, operators manning the interfaces and data-links should undergo training for 
the relevant system(s) or sub-system(s). Training would provide the opportunity 
for new operators to understand and learn about the technicalities and 
functionalities of the system that they are to work with. With the increased 
connectivity between NCW systems, the influx of data/information could 
overwhelm an untrained operator, and make him/her less effective in responding.   
6. Information Security 
Interoperability between large numbers of systems requires the 
backbone of a network-centric concept. Network-centric operations 
involves synchronized execution of distributed operations, 
widespread sharing of situational awareness and decision-making 
data. To achieve interoperability, they would require a dependable 
underlying information and communications infrastructure. 
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The disruption or denial of computation or communications 
connectivity and the corruption or destruction of data would highly 
degrade or even render ineffective the network-centric approach to 
operations. The greater the dependence on information-sharing 
and communications capabilities, the more attractive attacks 
become against them—by both highly sophisticated and less 
sophisticated adversaries—to undermine U.S. operations. 
As a result, information assurance11 (IA) provided by protecting 
information and communications systems against the threats of 
adversaries, is seen as a vital part of network-centric warfighting 
capabilities.  (Committee on Information Assurance for Network-
Centric Naval Forces, 2010) 
Note that cybersecurity vulnerability and information assurance 
vulnerability were viewed as inseparable and were treated as such in the report.  
Cybersecurity threats can be broken into four types, namely: remote 
access, close access, life cycle or supply chain insertion, and insiders, with the 
common intention of disrupting system functions, modifying data and/or stealing 
data. These “threats change on a timescale much shorter than the typical 
Department of Defense acquisition cycle for developing and deploying 
cybersecurity technologies.” (Committee on Information Assurance for Network-
Centric Naval Forces, 2010)  Along with the increasing reliance on commercial 
information technology systems in the conduct of warfighting, the U.S. Navy 
faces a serious cybersecurity threat to their warfighting capability. 
A technical response to cyberthreats and information assurance needs of 
a Naval NCW proposed in the Information Assurance for Network-Centric Naval 
Forces could be applied to other forces. Planning for IA involves risk 
assessment, risk mitigation and actual implementation of these risk mitigation 
strategies. For risks that cannot be mitigated or reduced, steps should be taken 
to remove these risks through changing the design of the network architecture.   
                                            
11 Information assurance is defined in the Department of Defense instruction documents as 
“measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their 
availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation.  This includes providing 
for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection and reaction 
capabilities (Committee on Information Assurance for Network-Centric Naval Forces, 2010). 
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The architecture that the SoS network is built on should be designed 
according to a set of principles that address the essential characteristics of a 
system for assuring information and counter vulnerabilities resulted from poor 
planning for information assurance and overarching system weaknesses. The 
process of system architecture development should also be iterative and 
adaptive to ensure that the resultant SoS will remain robust in the despite 
emerging threats and technological changes. 
An IA roadmap could also be formulated using the suggested elements 
compiled for an advanced naval IA research program covered in Appendix I, 
Table 9.    These elements could be prioritized and implemented based on the 
needs of the SoS. 
7. Concept of Operations 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is: 
[a] verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses 
what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it 
will be done using available resources. The concept is designed to 
give an overall picture of the operation. Also called commander’s 
concept or CONOPS.  (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010) 
As such, CONOPS should be driven by the mission requirements. 
Concept of operations of the SoS should be correlated with the architectural 
design of the SoS as the mission requirements which drive the concept of 
operations should also drive the SoS network architecture design and operations.   
CONOPs, as described in CJCSI 3170 JCIDS series, are written to 
describe how a joint force commander may organize and employ 
forces in the near term (now through 7 years into the future) in 
order to solve a current or emerging military problem. These 
CONOPs provide the operational context needed to examine and 
validate current capabilities and may be used to examine new 
and/or proposed capabilities required to solve a current or 
emerging problem.  (Defense Acquisition University, n.d.) 
CONOPS can also represent the guidelines in which combatants should 
follow in their missions and thus should be clear and non-conflictive with the 
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mission requirements. It is the responsibility of the commander in charge of the 
sub-mission group to make necessary efforts to ensure the CONOPS are clear 
and applicable to the relevant missions and correctly propagated to the 
subordinate combatants.   
8. Management of Change Requirements 
Requirement changes are not uncommon and could require numerous 
changes or high-impacting changes to the SoS network architecture, CONOPS, 
etc. With turnovers of commanders in the military hierarchy, there would be a 
change of the major stakeholders of the SoS. Different individuals would have a 
different idea of how they would command the system or use the system to carry 
out their missions. Changing threat demographics, such as a higher dependence 
on unmanned assets versus manned systems, would also cause mission 
requirements to change with time.   
A system to manage changes such as introduction of an approval forum to 
prioritize and/or control change requirements and logging down a description of 
changes made could help to regulate the changes made to the SoS. The SoS is 
comprised of multiple systems and owners for SoS configurations spanning 
multiple forces or even international ally forces. Any change raised could 
ultimately affect the rest of the other systems or could cause a reduction in the 
overall set of capabilities of the SoS network or of sub-clusters of systems.  
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VI. MODELING OF MULTI-SYSTEM AND TARGET-RICH 
ENVIRONMENT 
A. PROBLEM  
Intersystem interoperability requires connection, cohesion and coupling 
between these systems. When the quantity and variety of systems participating 
in the multi-system network increase, the ability to achieve a certain level of 
performance in terms of timely transmission or exchange of data/information 
could influence the result of a joint SoS mission.  
B. BACKGROUND  
With increasing deployment of unmanned platforms (for both own-force 
and adversaries) and increasing intersystem linkages in today’s battlespaces, it 
is pertinent for decision-makers to consider the tradeoffs between timeliness of 
data/information exchange, amount of data/information that is sent/exchanged 
and the number of system nodes within the overall network of systems or system 
of systems. Integration of multiple, heterogeneous systems can increase mission 
effectiveness in combat but could also result in delays and security weaknesses 
in the overall system if ill-planned or ill-designed.   
The mission effectiveness of a SoS, in dealing with fast-paced and rapidly 
changing battlespaces, is highly dependent on the efficiency and effectiveness of 
acquiring situational awareness of the SoS operational environment and the 
command and control of the SoS in carrying out sub-missions to accomplish the 
overall mission. To be able to keep up with the fast pace of network-centric 
operations, the information dissemination, in-system processing and relaying of 
the information for other sub-systems to take action on would need to be timely.   
C. APPROACH AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Time delays within the SoS network would result in component systems 
receiving key data or information late. Actions could be taken on targets late or 
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not be acted on at all, as the target could have moved out of the system’s 
weapon range. Own-force systems or platforms could be destroyed by the 
adversary in the process. This, in turn, could result in the mission failure of the 
SoS.   
A pilot study was conducted to assess the time delays resulting from 
varying the number of messages being sent from an individual system node to 
the rest of the nodes in the SoS network and the number of system nodes layers 
which exist between the end nodes and the originating system node. This will 
provide insight into the impact of adding nodes to the overall system or 
increasing the message traffic to the duration of message propagation to the 
end-nodes of the system. For this study, a network model was designed and 
developed to represent a generic message transmission/broadcast network 
architecture, in which multiple systems are interconnected and message 
packages are sent from the originating system to adjacent systems and these 
systems subsequently propagate the information to their adjacent systems.   
The initial network model comprised a single channel for the transmission 
of data/information from the message generating system node to the end nodes 
of the SoS. Thus, it is referred to as the Single-Channel Data Transmission 
Simulation Model. This network model was then modified to accommodate a 
dual-channel data transmission configuration (referred to as the Single-Channel 
Data Transmission Simulation Model) to study potential improvements of the 
overall SoS performance in terms of data/information propagation timeliness. 
These network models and the interactions between the systems in the 
architecture are described in detail in Section F. 
Key assumptions used in the design and development of the model 
include the following: 
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 Processing delay at individual system nodes is simulated as an 
exponential distribution12 with a mean time of 1 simulation time unit. 
Slight delays are introduced to represent the time required to parse, 
re-format and present the information received in the display by the 
subsystem. Information was propagated further to other nodes 
downstream, with a mean simulation time unit of 1. 
 The maximum number of messages that can be processed by each 
system node is 3, simulating 3 message packages, carrying 
data/information as the maximum number of messages that can be 
managed by an individual system node. 
 Connection, coupling and cohesion are represented in the model 
through use of physical data-link connections between the system 
nodes, presence of processing delays at data/information receiving 
nodes and feedback of received data/information respectively. It is 
assumed that the information sent from a system node is received 
correctly, i.e., the data/information content sent by the sender node 
is received as the same content when received by the receiver 
node. 
 There is no restriction on the size of the data/information packages 
sent to or received by the system nodes and there is no restriction 
on the number of packages queued to be processed by individual 
system nodes. 
 Each system node is connected to one upstream parent node and 
could be connected to one or to two downstream children nodes. 
D. SOFTWARE USED 
ExtendSim Suite 8.0.1 was used to model a multi-system and multi-target 
environment and assess the problem of interoperability by investigating the 
connection, coupling and cohesion factors across these interconnected system 
nodes.  
The model developed in ExtendSim used discrete event modeling 
components to replicate message transmission between processing system 
nodes. The use of ExtendSim allowed for the logical representation of an 
                                            
12 Exponential distribution is used to randomize the waiting time to process different 
data/information packages as these packages could require different times to parse and decipher.  
Exponential distribution is the only continuous memoryless random distribution, making it more 
suitable as the process times of individual data packages are non-dependent on previously 
processed packages (Weisstein, 2012). 
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integrated system and the visual appreciation of message propagation amongst 
these nodes through 2D animation, which also facilitated troubleshooting. 
Specifically for this thesis, ExtendSim allowed for the ease of modeling dynamic 
interaction and processing delay of messages arriving from different channels 
and the extraction of overall SoS performance variables based on the capacity of 
data/information handling at individual nodes. In addition, the data output was 
extracted to Microsoft Excel for further analysis of results.  
E. HARDWARE USED 
The platform used to run the ExtendSim model was an Intel® Core ™ i5 
CPI13 Dual Core Dell laptop with 4GB of RAM (read-access memory), running on 
a 64-bit operating system and Windows 7. Note that the memory limitations of 
the laptop only allows for a maximum of 76 system nodes to be modeled in the 
ExtendSim software environment.  
F. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
1. Single-Channel Data Transmission Network Model   
To simulate a network of system nodes in ExtendSim, the “Local Area 
Network” discrete event modeling example available in ExtendSim Suite 8.0.1 
was referenced. Using a similar concept of information exchange between nodes 
in a network and representation of information as physical items in the system as 
the LAN model, system nodes were developed as individual hierarchical blocks14 
comprising of Queue and Activity blocks to imitate network buffers and system 
processors respectively. Other ExtendSim components such as Get, Equation, 
Select Item In and Select Item Out blocks were used to read, update and extract 
relevant performance characteristics of the SoS network architecture. Create 
                                            
13 CPI is clock cycles (alternating current pulses) per computer instruction that is being 
performed by the computer processor (Rouse, 2005). 
14 ExtendSim’s hierarchical capability allows for basic modeling constructs (such as a group 
of connected blocks) to be combined into a single, higher level construct, called a hierarchical 
block.  Hierarchical blocks is a special block that usually has a group of blocks nested within.  
Here, these blocks are used to help organize the model logically and enhance comprehension 
(Imagine That Inc., 2010). 
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blocks were used to generate data/information packages in the main message 
generating system node and other system nodes to generate and replicate 
messages correspondingly to be propagated to adjacent downstream system 
node(s). To track the elapsed time for data/information packages to arrive at the 
end system nodes and to return back to the originating message generating, item 
attributes such as message number (MsgID) and item or data/information 
generation time (BirthTime) were used. To ensure that each message had 
completed its propagation through its route through downstream system nodes 
until end nodes (i.e., system nodes with no adjacent nodes connected to them 
downstream) and back to the originating message generating system node, a 
counter (num_nodes) was used.   
Hierarchical blocks (H-blocks) were used to group the ExtendSim 
component blocks to represent them as individual system nodes. A generic 
system node H-block representing a generic system node and its corresponding 
component block breakdown are shown in Figure 10.  Enlarged sections of the 
generic system node are provided in Figure 11.   and Figure 12.   for easier 
reference. Each generic system node has two input and two output connectors 
with upstream or downstream connections as described in Table 1.    
Connection Description 
(blank) input connection Allows system node to be connected upstream to its 
parent node to receive data/information from it. 
Fdbk input connection Allows system node to connect to child/children 
node(s) to send feedback. 
Out output connection Allows system node to connect to up two 
downstream to two children system nodes to send 
data/information to them. 
Return output connection Allows system node to be connected downstream to 
up to two children system nodes to receive 
feedback from them. 
Table 1.   System Node H-Block Connection Representations 
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The message generating system node is represented as a black-colored 
system node H-block (Figure 13.  ) to differentiate it from the generic system 
nodes. Enlarged sections of the generic system node are provided in Figure 14.   
and Figure 15.   for easier reference. Although the components of the message 
generating system node are mostly similar to the generic system node H-block, it 
contains a Create block, which generates data/information packages for 
propagation to the other downstream system nodes in the SoS. The components 
also contain an Exit block to remove the items from the simulation at the end of 
their lifespan at the originating message generating node. Each item is 
considered to have reached the end of its lifespan when it is completed a cycle of 
propagating from the message generating node to an end-node and back to the 





Figure 10.   Generic System Node H-Block and Sub-Components  
 















Figure 13.   Message Generating H-Block and Sub-Components 
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Figure 15.   Message Forwarding / Feedback Collection Segment of Message Generating System Node 
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These H-block system nodes (both generic and message generating 
system nodes) form a network architecture of inter-linked system of systems. 
Through extending new child generic system nodes along the end-nodes of the 
SoS, the simulation was expanded to assess performance changes of the 
data/information propagation to all systems in the SoS and vice versa. Simulation 
runs comprised of varying number of system nodes in the SoS configuration 
were conducted with 3 generic system nodes as the simulation basic model. 
Subsequent runs were conducted starting with a SoS comprising of 5 generic 
system nodes, until there were 75 generic system nodes in the SoS. System 
node additions were doubled by the number of nodes of the previous layer of 
system nodes. The overall SoS network architecture of 7 nodes and 75 nodes 
are depicted in Figure 16.   and Figure 17.  , respectively. Refer to Appendix II for 
network architecture illustrations of various number of system node layers.  Table 
2.   illustrates how the number of layers of system nodes corresponded with the 
total number of generic system nodes in the SoS network modeled.   
 














of Layers Number of Generic System Nodes 
1 1 node (single node connected to message generating node) 
2 3 nodes (an addition of double the number of nodes in the 1st layer 
are connected to the outputs of the single node in the 1st layer)  
3 7 nodes (an addition of double the number of nodes in the 2nd layer 
are connected to the outputs of the 2 nodes in the 2nd layer)  
4 15 nodes 
5 31 nodes 
6 63 nodes 
6.5 75 nodes15 
Table 2.   Number of System Nodes Corresponding to Number of Layers in SoS 
Network 
In addition to varying the number of nodes in the system, the number of 
messages (or items) being created at the message generating system node at 
the start of every run was varied to simulate a multi-system and multi-target 
operating environment. As the number of systems in SoS network increase, more 
hops are required for the data/information packages to reach the end nodes and 
back to the originating system node, resulting in an increase in the time elapsed 
for the data/information packages to arrive at the end nodes and reach back at 
the message generating node. In addition, having a different number of systems 
in the SoS and a different amount of targets needed to be detected, processed, 
identified, and action-taken-against would vary the amount of information being 
sent from a single node to all other nodes in its network. Interoperability means 
interacting systems would need to update other systems of its own statuses and 
vice versa, e.g., if one system is operational or incapable of operations, send 
command and control instructions and exchange situational picture of their 
environments. As the number of targets in the SoS environment increase, the 
                                            
15 Note: Due to memory limitation of the laptop used to run the simulation, only 12 nodes 
could be added to the sixth layer of the SoS network. 
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number of these data/informational packages would naturally increase. This 
change in targets is modeled in ExtendSim through increasing the number of 
messages sent by the message generating node. 
Three databases (Send, Receive and Feedback) were defined in 
ExtendSim to store message information (MsgID and message BirthTime), and 
to record time elapsed (from message creation time) for messages to reach all 
end system nodes and maximum time elapsed (from message creation time) for 
message feedback to arrive back at the message generating system node 
respectively. Through the use of Equation blocks, these elapsed times were 
updated at various system nodes as the message (or item in ExtendSim’s 
context) passes through the Activity blocks in individual system nodes. The 
resulting output databases (Receive and Feedback) are then extracted and 
processed in Excel to obtain the interoperability performance results of this 
network architecture.  
2. Dual-Channel Data Transmission Network Model   
The single-channel data transmission network architecture utilizes a single 
data-link in which both types of data/information packages, regardless of 
message propagation or acknowledging receipt of the message is done through 
the same data-link channel. This data-link transmission configuration will affect 
the efficiency of the system nodes in the middle of the network hierarchy as 
these message packages will have to pass through the same processing unit of 
the system node. Coupled with an increasing number of targets in the 
environment, increasing intersystem connectivity would increase the number of 
data/information packages being exchanged between these system nodes. 
Given that the processing time of data/information packages at individual nodes 
is modeled using exponential distribution, the elapsed time for data/information 
propagation would increase with a steeper exponential increment as the number 
of system node layers increases. As expected, this trend increase in the elapsed 
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time due to an increase in the number of system node layers was observed in the 
simulations carried out for the single-channel data transmission network model 
(Chapter VII, Section C).   
The increase in the number of messages broadcasted to other systems in 
the SoS configuration, however, was expected to result in a near linear increase 
in the time elapsed for data/information packages to arrive at the end nodes as 
feedback returns along the same data channel would inevitably cause an 
additional delay. This was also observed in the simulation results, as plotted in 
Figure 20.  As the number of system node layers increases, the rate of increase 
in the data/information propagation elapsed time to reach the end nodes would 
also increase.  
In an effort to improve the timeliness of key data/information packages 
reaching all system nodes, a secondary channel was proposed to be added to 
the single-channel model to direct all feedback traffic along a separate 
communications channel. This thesis proposed and recommended the 
introduction of a satellite communications link, which would allow all generic 
system nodes to direct immediate responses back to the system node initiating 
the data/information propagation, with less geographical constraints as the 
satellite would be within line-of-sight (LOS) of a larger area of systems. This 
additional communications channel is modeled in ExtendSim through redirecting 
all feedback outputs (from the Return connector) of the system nodes to a Select 
Item In collector block, which links directly back to the feedback input connector 
(Fdbk) of the message generating system node. No modifications were made to 
the components within individual system nodes and the data used/extracted from 
the previously defined ExtendSim databases. The resultant network model for a 




Figure 18.   Modified SoS Network Architecture of 7-Node System  
The results obtained from the simulation runs of these network 
architecture models will be tabulated and discussed in Chapter VII. 
 
Added Select Item In Block to collect 
out feedback messages and redirect 
back to message generating node 
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VII. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
A. PERFORMANCE METRICS 
As described in Chapter VI, the ExtendSim model was designed and 
developed to assess the impact of increasing the number of systems 
participating in the SoS interoperability network and increasing the network traffic 
between these systems on the efficiency of message propagation in the SoS. 
Increased network traffic would be observed in a SoS due to both increasing 
system participation and increasing presence of targets in the SoS operating 
environment. Thus, to quantify the performance of the multi-system network 
model, the following performance metrics are used: 
 
Performance Metric Description 
Mean elapsed time to 
arrive at end-nodes 
Average time taken for data/information package to 
finish propagating to all nodes (which ends with the 
end-nodes). 
Maximum elapsed time 
to arrive at end-nodes 
Maximum time taken for data/information package to 
finish propagating to all nodes. 
Mean elapsed time to 
return to message 
generating node 
Average time taken for data/information package to 
propagate to all nodes and acknowledgement 
messages are sent back to the message generating 
node from all individual system nodes.  (Note that 
every system node was designed to return an 
acknowledgement of message received automatically 
to its parent node.) 
Maximum elapsed time 
to return to message 
generating node 
Maximum time taken for data/information package to 
propagate to all nodes and acknowledgement 
messages are sent back to the message generating 
node from all individual system nodes.   
Table 3.   Performance Metrics Description 
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The performance metric, “elapsed time to arrive at end-nodes,” provides a 
measure of how timely the data/information is broadcast and received by the 
nodes within the SoS. Shorter elapsed times for the data/information to reach the 
nodes in the network would help to save time for the response actions to this 
data/information to be taken. The longer a data/information package takes to 
arrive at the node that is required to take action on, the less accurate the 
data/information. The environment or circumstance of the battlefield could have 
changed significantly during the time elapsed for message propagation to render 
the information useless, especially in the modern day warfare, in which 
technological advancements have increased the speeds of warfare systems, 
making timeliness data/information very important.  
“Elapsed time to return to message generating node,” provides a measure 
of how long the system node initiating the data/information transmission would 
need to wait before sending subsequent information such as updates, commands 
or orders to the nodes. For interoperability to exist, a two-way form of 
communication is required to ensure that: firstly, the receiving node receives the 
data/information package; secondly, it acknowledges receipt of the package to 
the data-originating node and thirdly, the data-originating node is aware that the 
target node(s) has received the necessary information. In addition, this would 
provide a form of confirmation to the data-originating node that the target node is 
the correct recipient node and that the information was received accurately. 
B. CONDUCT OF EXPERIMENTS 
The two input variables for the simulation model runs are as follows: 
 The number of layers of system nodes in the network or number of 
nodes in the system. (Note: This is a better measure of the system 
node loading on the system than the actual number of system 
nodes, as this variable would directly influence the duration 
required to traverse adjacent system nodes.) 
 The number of messages broadcasted (sent) to the SoS. 
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For each SoS network architecture studied in this thesis, ten simulation 
runs were conducted for each combination set of these input variables to form 
the data samples obtained through these simulation runs. The output data is then 
tabulated in Microsoft Excel; the output data corresponds to the value of the 
performance metrics of the SoS.   
C. USE OF SINGLE CHANNEL FOR DATA TRANSMISSION 
The average time taken for varying quantities of data/information package 
to be delivered to the end nodes in a SoS network architecture of varying number 
of system nodes is tabulated in Table 4.  Note that there is no specific time unit 
used as the parameters used in this model could be modified to suit various time 




Layers  3  5  10  15  20  25  30  Remark(s) 
2  0.862  1.046  2.576  3.256  3.957  5.419  6.653  3 nodes 
3  2.914  4.302  6.305  8.631  11.885  13.812  16.502  7 nodes 
4  5.681  6.264  9.431  14.091  18.281  21.353  25.408  15 nodes 
5  7.512  8.399  13.718  19.080  25.308  32.571  36.808  31 nodes 
6  9.437  11.441  19.550  29.576  37.591  46.453  54.703  63 nodes 
Table 4.   Average Elapsed Time to Arrive at End-Nodes 
For appreciation of how the time taken by the data/information package to 
traverse all the system nodes to the end-nodes is distributed with changes in 
number of messages generated and the number of system node layers, a three-
dimensional plot of the distribution is generated from the simulation run whose 
results are shown in Figure 19.  The SoS traverse time is plotted against the 
number of messages for varying number of system node layers in the SoS in 
Figure 20.  It is also plotted against the number of system node layers in the SoS 
for varying quantities of data packages created at the message generating node 
in Figure 21.  It can be observed that the time taken for the data/information 
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package to traverse the SoS is influenced more by the number of layers of 
system nodes than it is by the quantity of messages.   
 
Figure 19.   Distribution of Message Propagation Time in Single Channel SoS  
Network Model  
It can be observed that the increase in the number of messages 
generated result in a resultant SoS traverse time that trends towards a linear 
profile for the network models with varying layers of system nodes (Figure 20.  ). 
As the number of system node layers increase, the rate of increase of the 
traverse time becomes higher. On the other hand, due to exponentially 
distributed processing delays incurred in individual system nodes, the SoS 
traverse time of the data/information packages will increase exponentially as the 
number of system node layers increases (Figure 21.  ). Similarly, as the number 
of messages being propagated in the SoS increases, the rate of exponential 
increase of the traverse time increases. Coupled, these phenomena would cause 







































the system nodes in the SoS, causing the data/information to reach at a delayed 
time since the point of first propagation within the SoS.  
 
 
Figure 20.   Trend Breakdown of Mean Time for Data-Packages to Reach End-Nodes 




















Figure 21.   Trend Breakdown of Mean Time for Data-Packages to Reach End-Nodes 
for Varying Number of Messages 
To understand the extent of the delay severity of the traverse time of the 
data packages, its maximum statistics for the varying number of node layers and 
messages sent were extracted as shown in Table 5.  The tabulated data was 
also represented as a three-dimensional plot (Figure 22.  ) to show the overall 
trend of the traverse time delay.   
          #Msgs 
#Layers  3  5  10  15  20  25  30  Remark(s)
2  2.924  3.064  8.641  7.604  10.123  12.933  16.391  3 nodes 
3  6.008  10.350  13.365  18.392  29.771  33.249  36.004  7 nodes 
4  14.039  12.314  24.820  32.004  39.979  51.960  52.902  15 nodes 
5  16.285  16.323  28.852  44.505  51.564  84.178  78.647  31 nodes 
6  14.890  20.088  43.298  64.422  85.441  106.706  121.390  63 nodes 





























Figure 22.   Trend of Message Propagation Time vs. Number of  
Node Layers and Messages in SoS 
The maximum delay experienced by the end-nodes in receiving the 
data/information sent from the message generating system node can be more 
than twice the average delay time experienced by these same nodes. Thus, in 
deciding how many system nodes and amount of data/information being 
exchanged between these nodes in the SoS, these delay factors should be 
considered.  
For the same set of simulation runs, the “elapsed time to return to 
message generating node” of the sent data/information packages were also 
extracted as shown in Table 6.  This data was also plotted in both three and two-
dimensional graphs (Figure 23.   Figure 24.   and Figure 25.   to better assess the 












































Layers  3  5  10  15  20  25  30  Remark(s) 
2  3.631  4.543  8.839  12.047  15.402  19.349  23.578  3 nodes 
3  9.637  13.878  22.486  31.275  40.298  47.838  56.603  7 nodes 
4  17.351  26.696  45.469  62.029  78.765  93.298  110.829  15 nodes 
5  35.613  51.474  92.551  122.284  154.735  184.355  214.726  31 nodes 
6  68.274  108.799  175.484  239.272  306.245  358.358  423.101  63 nodes 
Table 6.   Average Elapsed Time to Propagate to End-Nodes and  
Return to Message Generating Node 
 
Figure 23.   Distribution of Message Propagation Time for Data-Package  
to Return to Origin in Single Channel SoS Network Model 
The mean time taken by the data/information packages to arrive back at 
the message generating system node (also referred to as Origin) from system 
nodes in the SoS differs by a wider margin over different numbers of system 
node layers in the SoS (Figure 24.  ), as compared to the SoS traverse time for 











































The rate of increase of delay time from birth time of the data/information 
package until the package is propagated back to the message generating system 
node is found to be steeper (Figure 25.  ), as compared to the incremental trend 
of the SoS traverse time to reach the end-nodes. This observation is caused by 
the exponentially-distributed delays that these data/information packages will 
have to undergo when they re-track the system node pathways to send 
acknowledgement feedback to the originating node.  
 
Figure 24.   Trend Breakdown of Mean Time for Data-Packages to Arrive Back at 






















Figure 25.   Trend Breakdown of Mean Time for Data-Packages to Arrive Back at 
Origin for Varying Number of Messages 
Thus, from the simulation runs of the single-channel data transmission 
network model, it can be inferred that increasing the introduction of system nodes 
into a SoS would incur a greater cost on the efficiency and effectiveness of SoS 
performance than increasing message traffic in a SoS. Network architectures 
should be designed such that fewer delays are experienced between interacting 
systems, especially when the exchanges between these systems are frequent 
and with large amounts of data/information in the exchange. Efficiency and 
effectiveness of the mission conducted through NCW can then be further 
improved through control of the message broadcast, transmission or exchange 
within the SoS.   
D. USE OF DUAL CHANNELS FOR DATA TRANSMISSION 
The results for the simulation runs of the modified SoS network model, 




























acknowledgement messages to be returned to the message generating node 
directly, were obtained similarly as those extracted in Section C.   
        #Msgs 
#Layers  3  5  10  15  20  25  30  Remark(s)
2  2.029  2.537  3.409  4.592  5.520  6.580  7.607  3 nodes 
3  3.503  3.841  5.050  6.541  7.657  8.877  10.312  7 nodes 
4  5.265  5.386  7.069  8.442  9.394  10.805  12.087  15 nodes 
5  6.808  7.655  9.132  10.565  11.968  13.367  14.883  31 nodes 
6  9.786  9.665  11.190  12.585  14.532  15.164  16.912  63 nodes 
Table 7.   Average Elapsed Time to Arrive at End-Nodes for Satellite Model 
With the introduction of the secondary satellite communications channel 
into the simulated SoS network model, the time elapsed for the data/information 
packages to arrive at end-nodes increases approximately linearly with increases 
in the number of messages being propagated in the SoS and the number of 
system node layers (Figure 26.   Figure 27.   and Figure 28.  ). The average 
times required for the data/information to reach the end-nodes have been 
significantly reduced (Table 4.   and Table 7.  ). The redirection of the feedback 
traffic from the single-channel data transmission network model has helped to 
reduce the delays in the data/information propagation from creation to the end-
nodes. This presents added time-window opportunities for the receiving system 




Figure 26.   Distribution of Message Propagation Time in Single Channel SoS  
Network Model (Satellite Model) 
 
Figure 27.   Trend Breakdown of Mean Time for Data-Packages to Reach End-Nodes 





















































Figure 28.   Trend Breakdown of Mean Time for Data-Packages to Arrive Back at 
Origin for Varying Number of Messages (Satellite Model) 
        #Msgs 
#Layers  3  5  10  15  20  25  30  Remark(s)
2  4.615  5.939  10.420  14.813  19.115  23.804  23.779  3 nodes 
3  7.968  11.306  21.840  30.560  39.615  47.932  57.113  7 nodes 
4  14.791  23.980  46.260  64.460  84.095  97.760  117.717  15 nodes 
5  30.751  49.925  97.170  134.627  178.510  212.588  248.670  31 nodes 
6  62.158  101.524  200.530  294.760  377.660  451.340  527.297  63 nodes 
Table 8.   Average Elapsed Time to Propagate to End-Nodes and  
Return to Message Generating Node for Satellite Model 
Although improvements were observed in the timeliness of end-nodes 
receiving propagated data/information packages, the direct sending of feedback 
packages to the Origin did not improve the time taken for the messages to arrive 
back at the message generating node, as observed in Table 6.   and Table 8.  . 
Thus, it would take the approximately the same time delay before the message 




























further instructions. Nonetheless, this follow-up message will be able to arrive at 
the designated system node in the subsequent message dissemination in a 
shorter overall timeline. Thus, through changing the network transmission routes 
using additional communication channel(s), it is possible to shorten the overall 
message transmission time. To handle the increasing number of participating 
systems in the SoS and increasing number of targets in the environment, a 
secondary channel supporting the direct feedback of messages, such as a 
satellite link, would reduce the overall time delayed for messages to reach all 
systems and return to the originating system node. 
Having no improvement to the time taken for messages to propagate the 
system nodes and returning to the originating node could be a limitation of the 
data processing capability of the Origin system node in handling the increased 
network traffic. The acknowledgement message returns to the Origin could be 
modified to make the simulation more realistic by reducing the processing time at 
system nodes, as they should occupy a smaller data size as compared to key 
data/information packages. The capability of the nodes in the system to receive, 
process and act on data/information sent from other system nodes should be a 
key consideration in systems integration design and planning, as this would 
impact inter-linking systems when individual system nodes could be sending 
data/information out at the same time.  
Although potential delays may be incurred on the originating system node 
when receiving acknowledgement feedbacks from other nodes in the SoS 
network, these acknowledgement packages do not impact the operations of the 
other system nodes. In addition, in simulation runs on the new network 
architectural model, the introduction of the satellite communication channel 
allowed data/information to be delivered to the end-nodes in a largely improved 
timing. This greatly improved the overall SoS efficiency in reacting to rapidly 
evolving battlefield scenarios that require multi-system cooperation and a short 
response time. 
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E. DISCUSSION OF FUTURE WORK 
The simulation models used to replicate SoS network architectures are 
inadequate in their simulation to real-life SoS networks. Improvements could be 
made on these models to gather more in-depth statistics of the SoS 
interoperability performance given a greater variety of modeling variables. 
1. Possible Improvements to SoS Network Architecture Model 
Several assumptions were made in the design and development of the 
SoS network architecture models designed and studied in Chapters VI and VII to 
generalize the performances and/or constraints of the individual system in terms 
of processing time with an ideal propagation delay of zero simulation time units. 
System nodes were also allocated a common set of characteristic processing 
times and processing capacity of three data/information packages every time. 
The data/information packages generated and propagated by the system nodes 
were also of the same size, requiring the same amount of time to process by the 
individual nodes. The medium of information propagation was also assumed to 
be fixed, thus no additional processing or delay time was incurred in the network 
model due to this. 
These factors could be injected to the current network architectural 
models through correlating them with the modeling components available 
through ExtendSim. Some examples include: 
 Delay factors within system nodes could be decomposed into 
smaller elements and listed in a tabular database to provide better 
resolution to the actual delays incurred at individual system nodes. 
Additional Activity blocks could also be built into the network model 
to model the time latency of information transmission between 
system nodes. 
 Varying processing capabilities of individual system nodes could be 
modified through modifying their processing capabilities in the 
Activity blocks within each individual system. 
 Data/information package sizes could be referenced to existing 
network message package type and size. Depending on the type of 
the package, data bytes could be allocated to the package based 
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on the data/information that the package would contain. The 
processing times of these messages could then be varied 
depending on their size and the processing capability of the system 
node. 
 Data packet drops due to invalid data or time-outs (in which 
data/information package is no longer useful) could be incorporated 
into the ExtendSim models through modifications in the Queue and 
Activity blocks. 
The precision of modeling systems is dependent on the precision of the 
input parameters and system characteristics. Without the necessary information 
available, it would be difficult to obtain accurate knowledge of the system through 
it’s model. Thus, the more details that can be applied into the model, the more 
realistic and coherent the results will be with the real-world model.  
2. Comparison with Other Network Architecture Models  
Comparison studies could be conducted together with other types of 
network architecture models to evaluate the effectiveness of them handling the 
load of numerous systems and messages. Of interest is the network generating 
process described by Kawachi et al. (2004) as system nodes are re-linked to 
improve the performance of the system as a whole, with small average distances 
between nodes, with a bias such that links are moved to be adjacent to highly 
linked nodes (nodes of high degree). The network evolutions due to this method 
could be studied to evaluate the possible security risks involved and the system 
downtime or loss of information during re-linkages between subsystems.   
Dekker (2005) had described a new agent-based simulation system to 
study the impact of network topology (with networks developed from the process 
proposed by Kawachi et al.) on military combat effectiveness. The parameters, 
such as average distance, clustering coefficient and node connectivity, used to 
characterize the network models could be applied to the network models studied 
in this thesis and together with other potential network models so that the 
network architecture with the better performance could be chosen over others. 
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3. Quality Loss Function Analysis 
A general quality loss function which can be utilized to justify a decision on 
how much to invest to improve a process that is already capable of meeting 
requirements was developed by Don Oh and Langford (2008). This loss function 
could also be applied to evaluate the performance of the system (in terms of 
amount of time delay incurred between systems) versus the number of systems 
in the SoS network. This could provide insight into how much delay should be 
expected in a network of systems if there were to be that many numbers of 
systems participating in the data communications. The same could be done 
between performance of the system and the number of messages sent over 
these systems.    
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Systems in the world today are becoming more interconnected and 
complex, so as to achieve much more together than if they were on their own. 
However, to achieve the ideal end-state of smooth interoperability, it is important 
to understand what are the issues needed to be managed before solutioning can 
occur.   An analogy was drawn between interoperability of systems and the inter-
relationships between humans at work, which helped identify the factors that 
could affect the effectiveness and efficiency of system-to-system interoperability. 
These elements include command and control ontology to provide a framework 
to facilitate and regulate information exchange, local and global system stability, 
command and control of the systems and trust to enable C2.  
These factors were examined with regards to the problem of establishing 
and maintaining interoperability in a target-rich environment. Process 
decomposition was used to identify key processes to address interoperability, 
namely network architecture, C2, common ontology, systems integration, 
systems stability, information security, concept of operations and management of 
change requirements.  
To further study the issue of increasing number of systems in the SoS 
network and an increasingly congested environment, a network model was 
designed and developed in ExtendSim to simulate the transmission of 
data/information package(s) in a SoS network of multiple nodes and assess the 
factors causing the time delay in sending messages. The time delay or time 
taken for messages to reach intended system node(s) would influence the both 
the accuracy of the data/information sent and time remaining for the subsystem 
to react on the target.   
In the first version of the network model, a single channel, in which the 
data transmission and feedback was sent via the same channel, was used to 
propagate data/information messages from the message generating system 
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node to the rest of the nodes in the constructed network and back to the 
originating node. This simulated the connection, coupling and cohesion of the 
communications between the message sending system to the other systems as 
feedback messages are sent in reply to the sent messages from the message 
generating system. It was found that the number of layers of system nodes had a 
more profound impact on the timeliness of the messages arriving at the end-
nodes than compared with the number of messages being propagated through 
the SoS network. The message traverse time increased exponentially with an 
increased number of system node layers. A similar observation was made on the 
time taken for data/information packages to traverse from the message 
generating node to the end-nodes and back to the originating node.   
The single-channel data transmission model was modified into a dual-
channel data transmission network model through the addition of a separate path 
for feedback transmission back to the originating system node. With this change, 
the time taken to send the messages to the end system nodes from the message 
generating node was greatly reduced. The traverse time profile becomes 
linearized as compared to an exponential increase, as the network traffic of the 
messages sent from the message generating node to the end-nodes is not 
affected by the feedback return as the feedback has been re-routed to a direct 
link (e.g., via satellite communications) back to the originating system node. This 
illustrates an improvement in the time delay for data/information to reach the end 
system nodes. However, this direct routing of the feedback loop to the originating 
system node did not improve the time taken for the messages to arrive back at 
the message generating node, indicating that it would take approximately the 
same time delay before the message generating node can send out a follow-up 
message to the system nodes for further instructions. Nonetheless, this follow-up 
message will be able to arrive at the designated system node in the subsequent 
message dissemination in a shorter overall timeline. Thus, through changing the 
network transmission routes using additional communication channel(s), it is 
possible to shorten the overall message transmission time. To handle the 
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increasing number of participating systems in the SoS and increasing number of 
targets in the environment, a secondary channel supporting the direct feedback 
of messages, such as a satellite link, would reduce the overall time delayed for 
messages to reach all systems and return to the originating system node. 
Future works include parameter modifications to the existing network 
models to make them more realistic and applicable to other types of information 
transmission, comparison of the network models against other types of network 
models and performing quality loss function analysis on existing results to 
examine how much stakeholders are willing to pay for modifications to C2 
network architectures to improve its performance, and thus support critical 
decision making.  
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APPENDIX I: SUGGESTED ELEMENTS OF AN ADVANCED 







 Border Gateway Protocol/Domain Name Service 
protocol “hardening”—core network protocols responsible for 
routing and naming services for all Internet Protocol traffic. 
 Network filtering—filtering strategies to detect 
incoming attacks as well as outgoing exfiltration of sensitive 
information. 
 Network visualization—tools for alerting network 
operation to attack conditions. 
 Resilient networks—networks to ensure continual 
service while under denial-of-service attacks. 
 Source attribution—tools for ascertaining where a 
connection or attack is actually coming from. 
 Decoy networking—strategy to lure an adversary to an 
isolated network from which it can be monitored for 
intelligence (methods, behavior, and sources). 
System 
Level 
 Secure composition—means to ensure security 
properties of the whole system. 
 Artificial diversity—techniques to diversify computing 
fabric that allows interoperability, but also allows a change in 
structure of the same software for another implementation. 
 Collaborative software communities—a sharing of 
attack data to harden other instances of software against in-
progress attacks and developing related security alert 
sharing technologies. 
 Privacy-preserving technologies—technologies to 
allow effective sharing of data while maintaining strict 
compartmentalization. 
Host Level  Counter-evasion techniques for obfuscated malware—
methods to identify malware-embedded content flows. 
 Virtualization for security—technology for server 
consolidation and isolation of untrusted applications from the 
host operating system. 
 Self-healing software—software that monitors and 
models its own behavior. 
 Hardware life-cycle tamper resistance—techniques to 
detect compromises in chip-level designs and 
implementations during supply chain life-cycle attacks. 
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User Level  Behavior-based security—analysis of user behavior 
patterns to detect threats with reasonably high reliability. 
 Defense through uncertainty—leveraging uncertainty 




 Role and behavior-based access control—means of 
associating logical roles of a user with the specific data and 
applications used by the specific roles defined with an 
enterprise and a means of granting access to network 
resources. 
 Self-protecting security technologies—means of 
preventing denial-of-service attacks caused by a user 
accidentally or by design. 
Table 9.   Information Assurance Elements (From Committee on Information 
Assurance for Network-Centric Naval Forces, 2010, p. 89) 
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APPENDIX II  





Figure 29.   ExtendSim Network Model of 3 Generic System Nodes (2 Layers) 
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Figure 30.   ExtendSim Network Model of 7 Generic System Nodes (3 Layers) 
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Figure 33.   ExtendSim Network Model of 63 Generic System Nodes (6 Layers) 
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Figure 35.   Modified ExtendSim Network Model of 7 Generic System Nodes (3 Layers) 
 108
 
Figure 36.   Modified ExtendSim Network Model of 15 Generic System Nodes (4 Layers) 
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Figure 37.   Modified ExtendSim Network Model of 31 Generic System Nodes (5 Layers) 
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Figure 38.   Modified ExtendSim Network Model of 63 Generic System Nodes (6 
Layers) 
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